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ABSTRACT
Under what circumstances may a United States court exercise
personal jurisdiction over alien defendants? Courts and commenta-
tors have yet to offer a coherent response to this question. That is sur-
prising given that scholars have been calling for the globalization of
U.S. law since the late 1980s as part of a transnational litigation
narrative. 
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Through doctrinal and empirical analysis, this Article argues that
a U.S. court should have power to exercise personal jurisdiction over
an alien defendant not served with process within a state’s borders
when (1) the defendant has received constitutionally adequate notice,
(2) the state has a constitutionally sufficient interest in applying its
law or adjudicating a controversy involving its domiciliaries, and (3)
the policies of other interested nations whose laws would be arguably
applicable are given due respect and consideration and would not be
adversely affected by the exercise of jurisdiction. Personal jurisdic-
tion in transnational cases is, therefore, about choice of law. This
Article revises the transnational personal jurisdiction doctrine
through a concrete set of rules for courts to apply given the parties
and laws at issue before a court.
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INTRODUCTION
Transnational law and globalization talk is in vogue.1 Scholars
have created a massive oeuvre of transnational legal scholarship.2
Judges, including United States Supreme Court Justices, frequently
travel abroad to teach transnational law and take part in law
reform efforts in foreign countries.3 In some cases, judges cite
foreign law.4 United States law firms have created transnational
practice groups.5 Many law schools include courses in international,
transnational, and comparative law as part of their curricula and
encourage study abroad programs.6
1. Some recent examples include Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public
Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 891 (2008); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing
Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008); and Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized
Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).
2. “Massive” is not an overstatement. Indeed, a search of the Westlaw database for law
review articles in the last ten years turns up over 4,000 pieces that discuss “transnational
law,” with over 600 pieces having the word “transnational” in their titles.
3. See, e.g., Nathan Koppel, Supreme Court Justices Have a Busy Summer Ahead, WALL
ST. J. L. BLOG (June 14, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/14/supreme-court-
justices-have-a-busy-summer-ahead/ (detailing the Justices’ international summer travel
plans). 
4. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (considering foreign law and
international authorities to ascertain whether applying the death penalty to people under the
age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment). Less controversially, foreign law may appear
in judicial opinions when courts apply that law under choice-of-law rules. See, e.g., Matthew
J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door
to Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887, 890 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Global Disputes, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/globaldisputes/ (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013); Transnational Litigation and Foreign Judgments, GIBSON DUNN,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/practices/pages/GTT.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
6. Some schools now require such courses. See, e.g., About the J.D. Program at W&L,
WASH. & LEE SCH. L., http://law.wlu.edu/admissions/page.asp?pageid=311 (last visited Feb.
28, 2013); International Law, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/
internationallaw.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); International Opportunities, HARV. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/ils/international-opportunities/index.html (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013). Other schools offer these courses as electives in the first year of study.
See, e.g., Academics, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. L., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/academics.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2013); First Year Courses, U. CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/prospective/1Lcourses (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); First-Year Electives, COLUM. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/browse?global.c_id=304 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); First
Year Information, GEO. U. L. CENTER, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-
programs/jd-program/full-time-program/first-year.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
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This transnational focus responds to the notion that law practice
and the problems that lawyers resolve are increasingly “going
global.”7 The trend also responds to arguments for a “global com-
munity of courts” to resolve transnational legal problems—the idea
being that increased transnational activity will encourage courts to
interact more frequently with one another.8 Because of this global-
ization narrative, judges, lawyers, and law students are encouraged
to study transnational law to gain tools to be modern, global lawyers
practicing before modern, global courts. The academic narrative is
appealing. This narrative, however, has a real-world problem.
For all of globalization’s educational and personal benefits—and,
to be clear, there are many9—empirical analysis of the work of U.S.
courts in transnational cases surprisingly undercuts the practical
relevance of the globalization narrative for judicial decision
making.10 For instance, there is little empirical evidence that courts
extensively cite foreign law.11 Indeed, lawyers seldom rely on it in
arguing before courts, unless choice-of-law principles demand other-
wise.12 Instead of applying foreign law, U.S. courts typically adopt
one of two strategies. First, courts reject the application of foreign
law and apply U.S. law to transnational facts.13 Second, especially
in cases involving a foreign plaintiff, U.S. courts dismiss the case in
7. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 969 (1998) (explaining how American legal education is “going
global”); see also ANDREW S. BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION 3 (2003) (exploring how transnational litigation has emerged).
8. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J.
191, 193 (2003) (encouraging transnational legal dialogue between courts of different
countries).
9. See generally LISA K. CHILDRESS, THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY UNIVERSITY:
DEVELOPING FACULTY ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONALIZATION (2010) (explaining the history,
rationales, and benefits of international education in U.S. higher education).
10. See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2011) (detailing empirical analysis of transnational cases).
11. There is some evidence that this may be changing, with courts engaging with foreign
law “more often than ever.” Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New
Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign
Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 31, 37-39 (2011) (suggesting that “foreign law issues are indeed
growing in the U.S. federal courts—at least in the Southern District of New York”).
12. This may also be changing. Id.
13. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
1531, 1554 (2011).
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favor of another adequate foreign forum.14 Put simply, scholars urge
the global, and yet courts remain local.
One need look no further than recent Supreme Court decisions
involving transnational litigation to find a prime example of this
puzzle concretely moored in the personal jurisdiction doctrine. In
the case of Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, North
Carolina domiciliaries were killed in a bus accident in Paris, France,
due to an allegedly defective tire manufactured in Turkey by a
foreign subsidiary of Goodyear.15 Plaintiffs argued that the North
Carolina state court had general jurisdiction over the foreign defen-
dants because the defendants sold their product in the United
States, including in North Carolina.16 In another case argued and
decided the same day, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a
New Jersey plaintiff was injured by a metal-shearing machine while
working in New Jersey.17 The machine was manufactured in
England, where the defendant was incorporated, and distributed in
the United States through the English manufacturer’s independent
Ohio distributor.18 Plaintiffs argued that the New Jersey state court
had specific jurisdiction because the product was purposefully
directed at the United States market and caused an injury in New
Jersey.19 Given the foreign elements, both cases were ripe for the
Justices to take account of the transnational context in which the
personal jurisdiction doctrine operates, as the Court had done pre-
viously in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.20 
The Justices, however, never addressed the transnational facts of
the cases in the controlling opinions. Instead, the Court held in both
cases that the domestic personal jurisdiction doctrine did not permit
the suits to be maintained in the United States.21 Justice Ginsburg’s
14. Id. at 1561-64 (documenting this trend).
15. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
16. Id. at 2850-51.
17. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 2786, 2796.
19. Id. at 2786.
20. 480 U.S. 102, 106, 116 (1987) (finding no personal jurisdiction in California over a
Japanese manufacturer).
21. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851; Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785. Justice Breyer’s concurrence
in Nicastro, joined by Justice Alito, recognized that stating an absolute rule for personal
jurisdiction when the case involves a foreign defendant might be unfair. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
at 2793-94 (Breyer, J., concurring). However, Justice Breyer did not develop this argument. 
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dissent in Nicastro provided the only extended consideration of the
case’s transnational elements. There, she highlighted the reality of
marketing arrangements used by international sellers in a global-
ized commercial world in which U.S. companies distribute the
sellers’ products all over the United States.22 Justice Ginsburg sug-
gested that suing international sellers at the place their products
cause injury would be a fair and “reasonable cost of transacting
business internationally.”23 The plurality did not address these
arguments. In other words, the plurality was not concerned that
these cases were transnational and implicated the applicability of
U.S. law to facts occurring in whole or in part outside the United
States. For this reason, the transnational personal jurisdiction doc-
trine will continue to confound courts and commentators in the
years to come.
How courts treat these cases matters. Affording personal juris-
diction may increase transnational cases filed in the United States.
It may also increase the possibility of regulatory conflict between
U.S. and foreign sovereigns and their laws. Declining jurisdiction
may decrease the incentive of filing such cases in the United States
and impact the transnationalization of U.S. law. Whatever rule for
transnational personal jurisdiction is adopted will impact whether
transnational cases are filed in the United States; it will also influ-
ence whether U.S. courts engage with foreign law. 
This concern is not purely academic. Since 1986, roughly 120,000
lawsuits involving a non-U.S. party have been filed in U.S. federal
district courts.24 In 2005 alone, when the most recent data were
analyzed, 1,976 alienage cases terminated in U.S. federal district
courts.25 Although no precise figures exist, many of these cases
likely involved personal jurisdiction questions.26 As such, the Court’s
22. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 2800-01. 
24. Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67,
74 n.18 (2009).
25. Id.
26. Indeed, personal jurisdiction problems could grow in future years because the
Supreme Court may be on the verge of sending a significant number of international human
rights cases to state courts. See Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism,
and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 712-15 (2012); see also
Donald Childress, What If Federal Courts Close Their Doors to Human Rights Litigation?,
OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 5, 2011, 12:32 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/06/what-if-federal-
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unwillingness to examine the transnational elements in the cases
and provide concrete direction to lower courts is unsatisfactory.
The Court’s failure to analyze personal jurisdiction from a trans-
national perspective presents an important and compelling ques-
tion: Is globalization of law a chimera in U.S. judicial decision
making? Concretely challenging the claim that globalization of law
is occurring in U.S. courts, one recent study concluded that the
number of transnational cases filed is going down and has been for
some time.27 Despite the fact that the general caseload of the federal
courts has continued to rise, transnational cases have decreased
from a high of 3,293 cases in 1996 to 1,637 cases in 2005.28 The
author concluded that, among other things, U.S. federal courts may
evidence antiforeigner bias, at least as to extraterritorial harms.29
On account of this bias, plaintiffs in transnational cases may be
forum shopping away from the United States, which contradicts a
key component of the globalization narrative—namely, that the
United States is a magnet forum that attracts foreign cases to U.S.
courts. Foreign plaintiffs, in other words, may not wish to take ad-
vantage of a U.S. approach to transnational cases that is parochial.30 
There may even be a backlash to transnationalism. As one
leading federal appellate judge and former law professor provoca-
tively argued before the January 2012 gathering of the Association
of American Law Schools, the “cult of globalization” that has en-
tranced law schools should be discarded.31 “Quite a few law schools
have launched programs overseas, entered partnerships with for-
eign law schools, hosted globalization conferences, founded centers
geared towards globalization and fostered student exchanges
courts-close-their-doors-to-human-rights-litigation/.
27. Whytock, supra note 10, at 512-13.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 533.
30. For one recent example of this phenomenon, see Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to
Canada for Shareholder Litigation, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970203833004577247211369677658.html (discussing U.S. plaintiffs’
lawyers filing securities cases in Canada to avoid strict U.S. legal doctrines).
31. Walter Sobchak, Judge Cabranes’ Three-Part Prescription for Law Schools, TAXPROF
BLOG (Jan. 8, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/01/judge-.html
(quoting Judge José Cabranes, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Remarks at the
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 2012)). 
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overseas.”32 In his view, although “[m]any of these international
programs are worthy endeavors ... [they] are mostly a distraction
from the core objective of a law school.”33 Something funny has
happened on the way to U.S. legal globalization.
In light of this disconnect between academic and popular belief
and the current state of practice, foundational questions arise:
Should U.S. courts resolve transnational cases at all? If so, how
should they be resolved? Should generally applicable domestic
doctrines be used, or should they be updated to account for transna-
tional facts? These questions are not about transnational law per se
but are questions of domestic law and domestic institutional com-
petency to resolve transnational issues.
To answer these questions, this Article examines the personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens doctrines as they are applied
in transnational cases.34 Although globalization’s academic clarion
call has largely been ignored in judicial decision making, it must be
accounted for and developed by judges, lawyers, and academics to
meet the realities of litigation today. This process requires updating
domestic legal doctrines to account for transnational cases by
encouraging U.S. courts to treat transnational cases differently—by
focusing on the foreign facts and parties and their nexus with the
United States.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents a brief review
of the transnational litigation narrative that has gripped the legal
academy in recent years. Unpacking this narrative provides an
understanding of the nature of the problem that lawyers and courts
are supposed to address through transnational law. After explaining
the narrative’s development in the late 1980s, this Part evaluates
the accuracy of that narrative in light of modern transnational
litigation realities. After concluding that a robust version of the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. The goal of this Article is both theoretical and practical and thus responds to recent
entreaties to make scholarly commentary relevant to practice. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Chief
Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Apr. 7,
2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justice-roberts-on-obama-justice-
stevens-law-reviews-more/. See generally David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of
Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1345 (2011) (examining the veracity of the claim that scholarship has a limited impact on
practice).
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transnational narrative has been lost on courts, the Article sets
forward a new approach to the narrative grounded in domestic legal
doctrines. Specifically, Part II addresses the question of transna-
tional personal jurisdiction. After detailing the differences between
personal jurisdiction in domestic and transnational cases, this Part
critically evaluates the impact of the personal jurisdiction doctrine
when facts, law, or parties are foreign. Part III then grapples with
the increasing use of the forum non conveniens doctrine by U.S.
federal courts. Among other things, this Part shows through new
empirical evidence that forum non conveniens dismissals serve as
a growing, yet problematic, proxy for engaging foreign elements in
the personal jurisdiction inquiry. Part IV brings the transnational
litigation narrative detailed in Part I into closer focus and provides
a concrete proposal to resolve transnational personal jurisdiction
cases. Specifically, the Article proposes that a U.S. court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant not served
with process within a state’s borders when (1) the defendant has
received constitutionally adequate notice, (2) the state has a
constitutionally sufficient interest in applying its law or adjudicat-
ing a controversy involving its domiciliaries, and (3) the policies of
other interested nations whose laws would be arguably applicable
are given due respect and consideration and would not be adversely
affected by the exercise of jurisdiction. In Part V, the Article closes
by pointing to ways in which the transnational litigation narrative
may be invigorated by grounding it, as does this Article, more
concretely in the work of courts in transnational cases.
I. THE TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION NARRATIVE
Before discussing the transnationalization (or lack thereof) of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine,35 some account should be given to the
importance of transnational litigation and globalization for U.S. law
generally. At one point, the narrative pointed in one direction: U.S.
legal doctrines will be transnationalized as courts face global legal
problems.36 Recent studies point to a far different reality: U.S.
35. See infra Part II.
36. See Peter Roorda, The Internationalization of the Practice of Law, 28 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 141, 142 (1993).
2013] RETHINKING LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 1499
courts do not treat transnational cases differently in any significant
way.37 This Part describes the transnational litigation narrative
that created the academic field of transnational litigation and eval-
uates recent empirical studies questioning the narrative’s veracity.
It next situates the transnational litigation narrative within the
larger framework of U.S. law before analyzing what happens when
courts approach transnational cases through the personal jurisdic-
tion and forum non conveniens doctrines.38 In so doing, it provides
a starting point for the evaluation in Parts IV and V of how trans-
national law should relate to domestic legal doctrines.
A. Early Incantations: Creating the Field of Transnational Law
In its simplest articulation, the academic transnational litigation
narrative proceeds as follows: The Internet and cross-border activ-
ities have resulted in a transnational litigation explosion in the
United States and increasing transnational activity in legal prac-
tice.39 The world, and with it law, is going global—the idea being
that in a world of international commerce and communications,
national courts cannot avoid interactions with the larger, global
legal world, and lawyers and scholars cannot ignore the transna-
tional aspects of modern litigation.40 Because lawyers and courts
will increasingly face transnational issues, students, lawyers, and
judges should receive training in transnational law to deal with
these issues in sophisticated ways.41 Such training equips lawyers
to deal with the realities of modern legal practice and serve their
clients by encouraging sensitivity to transnational issues.42 
37. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
311, 325 (2002) (arguing for a “cosmopolitan jurisdiction” in light of the rise of cyberspace and
globalization).
38. See infra Parts II-III.
39. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2365 (1991) (detailing the litigation explosion); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 432 (2003) (same).
40. See PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
BEYOND BORDERS 4-5 (2012) (discussing the difficulty for actors confronted with “regulat[ion]
by multiple legal or quasi-legal authorities”).
41. See, e.g., Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 4, 63-64 (1995) (urging international legal education for judges, practitioners, and
students).
42. See id.
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As entrenched as the transnational narrative may be in today’s
legal discourse, the serious academic study of transnational liti-
gation in the United States is of a relatively recent vintage. The
modern usage of the term “transnational law” can be traced to 1956
when Philip Jessup, the Hamilton Fish Professor of International
Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, delivered three Storrs
Lectures on jurisprudence at Yale Law School.43 Later publishing
these lectures in a book entitled Transnational Law, Jessup ob-
served that the old labels of public and private international law did
not well serve the increased privatization of many international
legal disputes.44 He thus proposed a reexamination of traditional
international law doctrines under the umbrella of “transnational
law” to resolve issues crossing and transcending national borders.45
To Jessup, transnational law would include all municipal laws and
intergovernmental agreements that directly regulate the transna-
tional activity of individuals and the relationship between individu-
als and state governments.46 
Jessup’s approach was largely experimental and designed to en-
courage lawyers to approach transnational problems with “open-
minded intelligence instead of open-mouthed surprise.”47 In other
words, he recognized that old international law labels did not well
encapsulate current litigation realities—namely, that much liti-
gation involved private parties and not governments.48 Although
Jessup provided a new way to view these cases, he left it for another
day to provide a prescription for how lawyers should handle them.
The fact that transnational law came so late to academic dis-
course is perplexing. To be sure, a public international law dialogue
in academic literature dates back to the dawn of the modern law
school in the late nineteenth century. But this dialogue was con-
cerned mostly with the relationship between nations and interna-
43. PHILIP C. JESSUP, Acknowledgement, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). For other early
proponents of transnational law, see Myres S. McDougal et al., Nationality and Human
Rights: The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 901 (1974).
44. See JESSUP, supra note 43, at 106-07. 
45. See id.
46. See id. at 102-03, 106-07.
47. Id. at 108-09.
48. See id.
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tional organizations.49 Relatedly, a comparative law and compara-
tive constitutional law dialogue boomed after World War II, but it
was stifled in the late 1970s as academic winds blew towards public
law and the Warren Court.50 Surprisingly, international civil liti-
gation and transnational law study was sidelined.
Jessup’s call for transnational law largely lay dormant until the
late 1980s, with the state of academic commentary scattered across
various doctrinal areas without systemization—in other words,
without the unified narrative that Jessup proposed.51 Academic
focus then began to shift to studying transnational law as a species
of transnational litigation or international litigation in U.S. courts,
with significant attention given to issues relating to transnational
discovery.52 Discovery was the starting point for much of the aca-
demic discourse because of percolating issues related to the passage
of the Hague Evidence Convention in 1970, which entered into force
in the United States in 1972.53 To put the state of the field in
perspective, as late as 1988, no casebook addressed the subject, and
virtually no courses in major U.S. law schools dealt with transna-
tional law or litigation.54 
49. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Responsibilities of the United States, Internationally,
for Acts of the States, 5 YALE L.J. 161, 161 (1896); Tokichi Masao, The Kowshing, in the Light
of International Law, 5 YALE L.J. 247, 248 (1896).
50. David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar
Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2-3, 8 & n.24 (2011) (citing William O. Douglas, Foreword, 55 YALE
L.J. 865, 868-69 (1946)).
51. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons that Born and Westin produced their
influential casebook. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, Book Review, 34 VA. J. INT’L
L. 233, 239 (1993) (reviewing GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (2d ed. 1992)) (“[O]nly by a holistic approach to the
doctrines of international civil litigation can one fully appreciate the nature and complexity
of certain recurring concepts and themes.”).
52. E.g., Raymond Paretzky, A New Approach to Jurisdictional Questions in
Transnational Litigation in U.S. Courts, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 663 (1988); Mark J. Sadoff,
The Hague Evidence Convention: Problems at Home of Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 20 INT’L
LAW. 659 (1986); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101, 101-02 (1993).
53. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened
for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force for the
United States Oct. 7, 1972).
54. GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS, at xi (4th ed. 2007).
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The publication of Born and Westin’s landmark casebook in
198955 coincided with a series of high profile court decisions and the
publication of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, which together caused academic discourse to shift
and engage transnational law and litigation more fully.56 At that
time, some law review articles again focused on extraterritorial
discovery and the taking of evidence abroad under the Hague
Convention, largely in response to the Supreme Court’s 1987 de-
cision in Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District
Court.57 Other articles focused on the question of antisuit injunc-
tions, largely in response to decisions by the Second and D.C.
Circuits.58 A prescient article by Gary Born, written at the time the
Asahi case was pending before the Supreme Court in 1987, outlined
the issues faced when U.S. judicial jurisdiction extends to interna-
tional cases.59 Likewise, commentators began to investigate the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, largely in response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno60 and litigation re-
garding the disaster in Bhopal, India,61 which brought state courts,
and the appropriateness of those courts adjudicating transnational
harms, into the international law conversation.62 
Academic discourse and judicial decisions at this time proposed
a certain way of viewing transnational cases. The approach was
55. GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS (1st ed. 1989).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
57. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). For an example of commentary surrounding the Aérospatiale
decision, see George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention in the Supreme Court: A
Critique of the Aérospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525 (1989).
58. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International
Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 589-91 (1990); William L. Reynolds, The Proper
Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions in the
Federal Courts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1663, 1711-14 (1992).
59. Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1987).
60. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
61. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809 F.2d
195 (2d Cir. 1987).
62. See, e.g., David W. Robertson & Paula K. Speck, Access to State Courts in
Transnational Personal Injury Cases: Forum Non Conveniens and Antisuit Injunctions, 68
TEX. L. REV. 937, 938-42 (1990); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum
Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform
Standard, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 501, 502-04 (1993).
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largely one of balancing the transnational elements of a case within
a larger domestic discourse for adjudication.63 For instance, in the
antisuit injunction context,64 the rule was that the court should
examine “(A) whether the foreign action threatens the jurisdiction
of the enjoining forum, and (B) whether strong public policies of the
enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign action.”65 Forum non
conveniens motions were subject to a series of public and private
interest factors.66 Personal jurisdiction determinations were subject
to the Asahi Court’s unique reasonableness inquiry in transnational
cases that was meant to take account of the international context.67
Taken together, these balancing approaches to transnational cases
provided little concrete direction to courts and litigants.
Before the late 1980s, therefore, scholars paid little attention to
transnational law, and certainly no extended transnational liti-
gation narrative existed in the academic literature. Furthermore, to
the extent scholars directed serious attention at transnational
issues, their interest was largely responsive to particular cases
taken up by the Supreme Court or other courts—cases involving
discovery, antisuit injunctions, personal jurisdiction, and forum non
conveniens. In its infancy, the field of transnational law was reac-
tive to court decisions and not constitutive of a new view of U.S. law
when it encountered transnational elements.
Following these cases, another wave of transnational scholarship
emerged. Scholars began to recognize more concretely the interna-
tionalization of law and legal practice and organized symposia to
consider the implications.68 Scholarly attention also became directed
63. See, e.g., Paretzky, supra note 52, at 688-90.
64. Such injunctions may be sought (1) to prevent an adversary in the same dispute from
undertaking action in a foreign forum, (2) to consolidate claims pursued in multiple fora, (3)
for declaratory purposes, (4) to bar relitigation, and (5) to foreclose the foreign issuance of an
antisuit injunction. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 54, at 540-41.
65. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984)). 
66. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6 (1981).
67. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987).
68. Thomas E. Carbonneau, Introduction, Eason-Weinmann Center for Comparative Law
Colloquium: The Internationalization of Law and Legal Practice, 63 TUL. L. REV. 439 (1988);
see Roorda, supra note 36, at 141 (discussing Wake Forest’s Business Law Symposium,
Globalization of Law and Business in the 1990’s); Symposium, Current Issues in International
Litigation, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 439 (1993).
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at international litigation in light of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Asahi and continuing questions related to the Bhopal disaster
and the extraterritorial application of United States law, especially
federal antitrust laws.69 Thus began the academic field of interna-
tional civil litigation and the early transnational litigation narrative
that exists today.
Besides court decisions, what created this narrative in the late
1980s? An answer to this question can be found in the scholarship
of Harold Hongju Koh. Writing at this time, Koh, who later became
dean of Yale Law School and legal advisor to the U.S. Department
of State, observed that an explosion in transnational commercial
cases was obliging federal courts to adjudicate suits with foreign
elements.70 Because of this explosion, Koh argued that new legal
tools should be developed to take account of its impact.71 Koh’s
approach, however, was directed at the development of international
law by U.S. courts and not the updating of domestic law to transna-
tional issues.72
69. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987
Duke L.J. 669, 670; Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and
Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1799, 1799-1801 (1992). Some attention was given during this time to the Alien Tort Statute
and the increased possibility of filing human rights claims under that statute. See, e.g., Anne-
Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM.
J. INT’L L. 461, 461-64 (1989). For purposes of this Article, I am leaving that discussion aside
as it relates only tangentially to the above narrative and is a narrative unto itself. Likewise,
I am purposefully glossing over the development of academic literature related to
international arbitration. Although international arbitration is a species of transnational
litigation, it is also a narrative unto itself and not the subject of study here.
70. Koh, supra note 39, at 2365 (“This growing faith in the capacity of the courts to engage
in domestic public law litigation coincided with a second trend: the explosion of transnational
commercial litigation in United States courts. As nations increasingly entered the
marketplace, and the United States adopted the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity
by statute, federal courts became increasingly obliged to adjudicate commercial suits brought
by individuals and private entities against foreign governments.” (footnotes omitted)).
71. See id. at 2382.
72. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1414 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2640 n.209 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
(1995)); Harold Hongju Koh, Gerald C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International
Law, Yale Law Sch., The 1998 Frankel Lecture at the University of Houston Law Center:
Bringing International Law Home (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646-55, 665-66
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Another scholar writing at the same time, Spencer Weber Waller,
provided a different approach. Waller argued that the explosive
growth of transnational litigation should lead to a unified approach
to all questions transnational that would replace the hodgepodge of
balancing approaches applied by courts.73 Waller’s argument for
unification sought to provide clear guidance to courts in adjudicat-
ing these complex questions.74 His conclusion was that U.S. courts
should create a unified approach, based on comity, to determine
whether the United States is an appropriate forum to adjudicate a
case.75 This “quick look” at the beginning of a case, in his view,
would be more efficient and productive than the balancing tests
previously applied.76 The courts, however, never heeded Waller’s
call.77 These and related reform proposals were based on an explo-
sion of transnational cases that allegedly necessitated a new way of
viewing transnational law.78 
The transnational litigation narrative is now fragmented.
Considerable attention is still given to the effects of globalization on
the law,79 to international human rights issues,80 and to treaty
(1998); see also Burley, supra note 69, at 489-93.
73. Waller, supra note 52, at 101-02.
74. See id. at 102.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1006
(2006) (“One area where convergence is not taking place is the law of personal jurisdiction in
international cases.”).
78. See, e.g., Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J.
775, 869 (2012) (advocating the development of international tribunals); Michaels, supra note
77, at 1069 (“If this traditional image of sovereignty is inadequate under conditions of
globalization, as is frequently claimed, then both [U.S. and European] paradigms are similarly
inadequate as well, and both sides must come together to create a new, third paradigm of
jurisdiction.”); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54
DUKE L.J. 1143, 1143 (2005) (“[T]he field of ‘Federal Courts’ scholarship ought to expand to
consider the relations not just between state and federal courts, but also between domestic
courts and judicial institutions operating at the international level.”).
79. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1103 (2000); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999).
80. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
399 (2000); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
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issues.81 Scholars also vigorously debate the role of customary
international law in United States courts82 and the legal implica-
tions of the Internet.83 However, no unified narrative brings to-
gether these various strands of transnational law. Furthermore,
although the educational benefits of studying transnational law are
real, questions remain as to the real-world impact that transna-
tional law has had on domestic courts. This impact, which is the
subject of the next Section, encourages a reconsideration of the
transnational litigation narrative. 
B. Modern Realities: Are Transnational Cases Different?
Due to the leadership of Koh and others, a generation of law stu-
dents and lawyers have been exposed to international and com-
parative legal materials.84 This study has blossomed today, with
virtually every major U.S. law school focused on the study of inter-
national and transnational law.85 On its own, this transnational
narrative is appealing because transnational cases have been heard
for as long as U.S. courts have existed.86 The narrative is also ap-
pealing because of a presumed increase in transnational litigation,87
81. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 79, at 546-50; David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the
Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
82. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Jack
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
83. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998);
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
84. For an example of Koh’s efforts, see Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is There a
“New” New Haven School of International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559 (2007).
85. See Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First Year
Civil Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479, 479 (2006); see also Franklin A. Gerurtz
et al., Report Regarding the Pacific McGeorge Workshop on Globalizing the Law School
Curriculum, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 267 (2006) (detailing a 2005
conference of professors from thirty-one law schools to discuss the introduction of
international and comparative law issues into the law school curriculum).
86. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence
of Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 305 & n.22 (2008)
(discussing this development).
87. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 496.
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which should lead to an increase in transnational issues for lawyers
to resolve. Questions do remain, however, about the impact of
transnational cases on U.S. courts.
Available data makes answering the question of impact hard. To
begin with, federal and state courts keep incomplete information on
the filing and disposition of transnational cases.88 What data is
available seems to discount the belief that there is increasing trans-
national litigation,89 although, of course, there may be increasing
transnational issues requiring legal advice that do not make it to
litigation or are not reported by courts. Furthermore, even when
evidence is available showing transnational issues, such as through
judicial decisions available in legal databases, the courts’ treatment
of transnational cases is incredibly parochial. In most cases, little
attention is given to the transnational nature of the case. Domestic
doctrines are applied as they are in purely domestic cases, with
perhaps some passing reference given to the transnational facts or
parties involved in the dispute.90
In a nutshell, the problem with the transnational litigation
narrative is that in its modern incarnation it is a narrative designed
to encourage transnational litigation in U.S. courts in order to
develop international law. The reaction of courts to that narrative
has been mixed, with empirical evidence suggesting that (1) courts
are resisting adjudicating such cases, and (2) to the extent they
adjudicate such cases, they do so using a domestic frame of refer-
ence.91
There are some doctrinal outliers, and these outliers will be the
focus of the parts that follow. As will be discussed below, the per-
sonal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens doctrines include
analytical prongs to account for transnational facts.92 This Article
will analyze the uniqueness of foreign elements for these doctrines.
88. See id. at 509 & n.137, 529. 
89. Id. at 506-07, 529.
90. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
91. See infra Part III.
92. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (“The unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal
jurisdiction over national borders.”); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)
(including the avoidance of applying foreign law among the public interest factors affecting
the convenience of a forum).
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But, before reaching that point, some preliminary consideration
should be given to why such a study is fruitful and how it relates to
the transnational narrative discussed above in this Part.
First, the goal of exposing law students and lawyers to transna-
tional law should be more than life enriching (of course, it certainly
is that); it should also inform legal doctrine. There is an increasing
divide between the academy and practice, and that divide is clearly
apparent in the transnational litigation narrative, which in many
respects is oblivious to the “law in action.”93 Thus, in what follows,
the Article attempts to correct that issue.
Second, failing to take account of foreign elements stymies critical
evaluation of judicial caseload management.94 If we do not know the
precise reasons a court resolves a case, we cannot effectively provide
a democratic check on what courts do. Courts should tell us why
transnational cases are different and how that difference leads to a
particular rule of decision. Failing to do this prevents the potential
for legislative and other legal reform. In other words, “honesty is the
best policy, even in judicial opinions.”95 
Third, the lack of clear rules in transnational cases creates liti-
gation costs.96 Parties are forced to litigate transnational issues
without knowing what rules apply and thus cannot determine
whether filing a case in the United States makes legal and economic
sense.97 Judicial resources are also expended in resolving what
should be fairly straightforward questions on account of the lack of
a clear rule.98 
93. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 4 (2007),
available at http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrary_pdf_
632.pdf; John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in the United States: Being
Educated for Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
975, 991-96 (1997) (recognizing the lack of preparation among graduating law students for the
growing global challenges, despite the proliferation of international law courses in the late
1990s).
94. See generally Whytock, supra note 10. 
95. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 300 (4th ed. 1986).
96. Cf. Barry Friedman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Fragmentation of the Federal Rules,
79 JUDICATURE 67, 70 (1995) (“The more the two sides in a lawsuit see the costs or outcome
depending on the district where the case is litigated, the more there will be fights over venue
and jurisdiction.”).
97. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 486-87.
98. See Global Forum Shopping Fact Sheet, INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, http://www.
2013] RETHINKING LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 1509
Fourth, the short shrift given to foreign elements may cause
backlash. If domestic courts do not resolve such cases in honest and
respectful ways, then the impression that the U.S. legal system is
a system of law is discounted.99 That in turn may lead to conflict
with foreign sovereigns, such as through blocking statutes, and may
create access-to-justice issues.100 It may also lead to foreign law
reform—namely, forum shoppers may return to their home coun-
tries and seek justice there through procedural and substantive
changes to that law.101 This may lead to conflicts with U.S. law.
Tackling these important issues requires concrete perspective.
Rather than taking a holistic perspective on transnational litigation
generally and treating it as a general field for study, this Article
looks at the two most pressing areas of domestic law in which trans-
national elements are resolved. Those areas are, in the order they
are discussed in the Parts that follow, personal jurisdiction and
forum non conveniens.102 These areas represent the critical issues
in transnational cases103 and help answer the following questions. 
First, can a transnational case be filed in the United States
(personal jurisdiction)? Second, should a transnational case be filed
here (forum convenience)? Third, what law will be applied if a trans-
national case is filed here (choice of law)? Fourth and finally, in the
event a transnational case is not filed here or is filed here but
dismissed on account of one of the other doctrines, will a U.S. court
enforce a judgment rendered abroad (enforcement)? Answering
these questions provides the starting point for evaluating whether
the transnational narrative is viable today and, more importantly,
instituteforlegalreform.com/featuredtool/global-forum-shopping-fact-sheet (last visited Feb.
28, 2013).
99. See Wilson, supra note 4, at 889 (“[T]he resolution of foreign law claims in national
courts is generally consistent with comity and amicable commercial relations between nations.
It is akin to recognizing the legitimacy and application of the foreign state’s law.”).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 905
& cmt. b (1987) (describing countermeasures); Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1444, 1492-93 (2011) (describing how foreign displeasure with the handling of
international matters in U.S. courts has resulted in retaliatory legislation).
101. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 100, at 1493.
102. See infra Parts II-III.
103. See, e.g., Robertson & Speck, supra note 62, at 938 (“The battle over where litigation
occurs is typically the hardest fought and most important issue in a transnational case.”).
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what should be done with transnational cases filed in U.S. courts,
which is the subject of Part V. 
II. TRANSNATIONAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Part of the problem with the transnational litigation narrative
explained in Part I is that it in many ways lacks concrete applica-
tion. In other words, it is a narrative about why transnational cases
should be filed in the United States and not one directed at what
courts should do when such cases are filed. To make the narrative
more concrete and relevant for transnational practice, this Part first
discusses the domestic personal jurisdiction doctrine and then how
that doctrine is applied in transnational cases. After explaining
briefly the doctrine’s development, attention is given to empirical
evidence of what actually happens in transnational cases when a
party files a personal jurisdiction motion. This Part and the ones
that follow are organized around the key questions in most transna-
tional cases. I will call these questions the “who,” “when,” and
“where” of transnational litigation: Who can be sued in the United
States (personal jurisdiction)?104 When can they be sued here (forum
non conveniens)?105 And where should transnational cases be filed
(the normative question addressed last, or in some cases first as a
proxy for choice of law)?106 
A. Domestic Personal Jurisdiction
The most important question in virtually every case relates to
jurisdiction: Can suit be brought against a particular defendant in
a forum of the plaintiff’s choosing?107 So, for instance, a Virginia
104. See infra Parts II, IV.
105. See infra Part III.
106. See infra Part IV.
107. This inquiry of personal jurisdiction is one dimension of adjudicatory jurisdiction,
“which refers to the power of a court to hear a case.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 617-18 (2006) (identifying adjudicatory
jurisdiction, which encompasses personal jurisdiction, as “the central and most basic
preliminary issue faced by courts in the United States”). Of course, other preliminary
questions also matter: Should the case be pursued? Can the case be settled? Is litigating the
case economically efficient? But, assuming the decision is made to bring the case in court, the
question then becomes one of jurisdiction. To be clear, two types of jurisdiction are relevant
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plaintiff injured in Virginia by a California corporation—if the
corporation’s only contacts are with Virginia and California—must
choose whether to bring suit in California under general jurisdiction
or in Virginia under specific jurisdiction.108 The decision to file in
one or another U.S. forum will be made based on both convenience
to the plaintiff (which would include an expectation of a favorable
court) and choice of law. In other words, filing the case in her home
state might be most convenient for the Virginia plaintiff. Yet, she
might choose to file the case in California if California law, which is
arguably applicable under California choice-of-law rules, is more
favorable to her case.109 In this hypothetical, the question of forum
choice is not unlimited because the plaintiff may file suit only in
Virginia or California. In the event the plaintiff’s chosen forum is
inconvenient, the case may be transferred to the other forum.110 
Unlike this simple hypothetical, the question of forum choice is
far from clear in many cases. For instance, imagine that a Virginia
plaintiff is injured in Virginia by a product distributed by an inde-
pendent distributor in New York; the distributor purchased the
product from a manufacturer in California who has never sold any
of its products in Virginia and had no reason to believe the product
would end up there.111 Subjecting the distributor to specific personal
jurisdiction in Virginia seems clear enough, but what of the manu-
facturer? Likewise, should the suit be brought in Virginia, New
York, or California?112 What law should apply?
in U.S. federal courts: subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Id. Personal jurisdiction is
most relevant in U.S. state courts. See id. at 618. The focus in this Part and in what follows
is on personal jurisdiction.
108. Should the case be in excess of $75,000, the plaintiff will also have a choice to bring
suit in either state or federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Regardless, the personal
jurisdiction will be the same. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (requiring federal courts in diversity
to apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the state in which they sit).
109. This hypothetical demonstrates many of the common considerations of forum
shopping. See Whytock, supra note 10, at 486-90 (“[F]orum shopping is a form of strategic
behavior that depends, among other things, on expectations about favorable court access and
choice-of-law decisions.”).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1404. A state court might transfer the case to another state court under
the forum non conveniens doctrine.
111. This hypothetical is a modification of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980). 
112. Here again, transfer can resolve the problem. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
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Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction questions continue to con-
found, even though sixty-seven years have passed since the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington established the modern doctrine of personal jurisdic-
tion.113 To understand this confusion, consideration must be given
to established doctrine in domestic cases before analyzing its
relevance to transnational cases.114 What follows is a brief explora-
tion of the domestic personal jurisdiction doctrine’s highlights.
The original understanding of personal jurisdiction in the United
States “evolved in a rich and complex historical setting,” creating a
“story [that] is long, convoluted, and not lacking in ambiguity.”115
Before International Shoe, a state’s jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant depended on the defendant’s presence in the forum,
either through voluntary appearance or through service of process
in the forum state.116 Service provided the requisite notice that the
defendant was subject to suit, and presence in the forum gave the
state power over the defendant.117 In the Court’s view, this require-
ment was based not only on international law limits on sover-
eignty118 but also on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.119 The benefit of this approach was that choice-of-
113. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (announcing the minimum contacts requirement for personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants).
114. For a short list of some of the treatments of the doctrine, see, for example, Paul D.
Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66
MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts:
Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189 (1998); Austen L. Parrish,
Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defendants, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2006); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle
in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529 (1991); and Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum
Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010).
115. ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L LAW, ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 79 (2007).
116. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
117. See id. at 729-34.
118. See id. at 722-24 (recognizing two principles of public law that limit state sovereignty:
(1) “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory,” and (2) “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory”); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 50-51, 100 (2006) (discussing Pennoyer and other Supreme
Court cases to highlight the Court’s historical use of international law in constitutional
analysis).
119. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733 (explaining that due process of law requires a tribunal
to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before it can exert its power to render a valid
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forum questions were easily resolvable. One could either sue a
defendant in the defendant’s home state or serve her with process
in the state in which the plaintiff would prefer to sue. Forum choice,
and with it choice of law, was tied to presence.120
Why did personal jurisdiction exist only when the defendant was
physically present in the forum? The traditional story is one of
power. At least since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., courts
have noted that “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power.”121 In other words, courts have the power to decide a case
only when they have the power over a defendant to adjudicate the
controversy, and that power comes by serving a party with process
within the borders of a state—an act akin to seizing the defen-
dant.122 The invocation of a state’s “power” serves as a proxy for
other values, such as due process. Uncovering these proxies provides
important understanding for what the personal jurisdiction doctrine
seeks to accomplish.
For example, Albert Ehrenzweig called such an understanding of
judicial jurisdiction the “power myth.”123 Ehrenzweig’s thesis was
that little to no case law around the time of Pennoyer v. Neff sup-
ported explaining personal jurisdiction as a function of power.124 In
his view, “[T]he concepts of ‘physical power[,]’ ... which are com-
monly invoked to justify [personal jurisdiction,] can ... be shown to
be results of an unsuccessful endeavor to give the appearance of
judgment affecting private rights). The Fourteenth Amendment was arguably not relevant
at all given that the facts of Pennoyer occurred before its ratification. Id. at 719-20 (explaining
the facts of the case, which took place in 1866, two years before the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Nonetheless, the Court later ratified the constitutional argument
in Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1915).
120. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945) (noting, once presence was
established in Washington, that “[t]he activities which establish [the company’s] presence
subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax”). This understanding
is consonant with early understandings of judicial jurisdiction in England. See Harold G.
Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 261 (1991) (noting that “jurisdiction to adjudicate was synonymous
with jurisdiction to prescribe in early England”).
121. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
122. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618-19 (1990) (recognizing the
territorial limits of a state’s power and finding that a forum has jurisdiction over a defendant
when that defendant is served within the forum).
123. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956).
124. Id. at 292-93.
1514 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1489
rationality to an irrational rule” that was the result of “a lack of
insight into the significance of contemporary events or intervening
changes in the functioning of legal rules.”125 Instead of basing per-
sonal jurisdiction on power, Ehrenzweig proposed that personal
jurisdiction be reconceived as a species of venue that would “limit[]
the choice of the forum on rational grounds to one having such con-
tacts with the case as [would] justify the application of the chosen
forum’s own law.”126 In other words, power over the defendant is an
incident of the power to declare a certain law binding on the
defendant. In Ehrenzweig’s view, personal jurisdiction is concerned
with choice of law.127
His is not the only way to view the doctrine. Notwithstanding
Ehrenzweig’s interpretation of the governing precedents and broad-
side attack on the power theory of personal jurisdiction, various
studies have continued to ground personal jurisdiction in power. In
perhaps the most comprehensive survey of what would appear to be
all judicial jurisdiction cases leading up to Pennoyer, James
Weinstein concluded that whereas English case law was not based
on a power theory of jurisdiction,128 American case law at the time
of that case clearly recognized a concern with the allocation of
power.129 Weinstein’s conclusion, however, departed from the tradi-
tional power theory in an important way. In his view, the traditional
power theory is used to connect personal jurisdiction to the Due
Process Clause.130 According to Weinstein, the power theory that
existed at common law was designed to promote interstate federal-
ism, most specifically through the Full Faith and Credit Clause.131
Under Weinstein’s view, the power that the courts were concerned
with was not simply the power of a state over a defendant but the
125. Id. at 293.
126. Id. at 292. For a similar argument contesting the power theory of jurisdiction, see
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241.
127. Ehrenzweig, supra note 123, at 290-92; see also James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 872-73 (1980) (suggesting a connection between
personal jurisdiction and choice of law by arguing that a state should not be able to apply
forum law unless it meets the minimum contacts test required for specific jurisdiction).
128. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169 (2004).
129. Id. at 203-04.
130. Id. at 171, 214-22.
131. Id. at 181-204.
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power of a state over a case in relation to the power of other states
to adjudicate the controversy.132 As such, a pure due process theory
of personal jurisdiction does not give adequate concern to important
federalism facets of the debate.133 Personal jurisdiction, in this view,
is a doctrine of federalism concerned with the allocation of adjud-
icatory authority between the several states.134
Even with these very broad strokes, we can provide an answer to
a not-so-simple question: What is the power narrative in personal
jurisdiction a proxy for? On the one hand, power is a proxy for
fairness. It would seemingly be unfair for a defendant to be brought
before a forum court in which, because of her lack of presence, she
could not expect suit to be brought because she would not expect
that court to apply forum law. On the other hand, this concern of
state power might be directed at the allocation of power between the
several states. So, fairness to the defendant is really a question of
appropriateness in a federal system to have the case heard in one or
another state’s court and under one or another state’s law. Put
simply, the doctrine is not concerned with power alone; the concern
is the power to apply law and through that application either in-
fringe on a defendant’s rights or the balance of power in the federal
system.
These debates have largely been disregarded in modern personal
jurisdiction case law in favor of jurisdictional tests based on pur-
poseful “minimum contacts”135 and “reasonableness”136 grounded in
due process.137 The test is now a modification of the well-known
132. Id. at 260-61.
133. Id. at 181-204.
134. E.g., Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 61-62 (2010); Allan R.
Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEX. L. REV. 689, 690 (1987). But see Parrish, supra note 114, at 55 (suggesting that interstate
sovereignty concerns may no longer be relevant in domestic personal jurisdiction cases but
recognizing that “sovereignty remains the key constraint on jurisdiction internationally”).
135. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
136. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (articulating the
following factors as relevant to determining whether jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) the burden
on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interests; (3) the plaintiff’s interests; (4) “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies”; and (5)
“the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies”).
137. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10
(1982) (noting that the Due Process Clause “is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
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International Shoe test: a defendant must have the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the forum state such that the assertion of
jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”138 The due process analysis in personal juris-
diction protects the defendant’s due process right in “not being
subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which [the defen-
dant] has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”139
In order to ensure the requisite connection between the defendant
and the sovereign, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
two types of adjudicatory authority.140 General jurisdiction applies
when the defendant’s connections with a forum are “so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against [her] on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities”;
thus, for example, the “paradigm forum” for general jurisdiction is
the defendant’s home forum.141 Specific jurisdiction, on the other
hand, applies when the defendant has fewer contacts with the
forum, but the defendant’s in-forum actions “may be sufficient to
render [her] answerable in that State with respect to those acts,
though not with respect to matters unrelated to the forum connec-
tions.”142
Thus, the Court has rejected federalism as a ground for personal
jurisdiction, noting that the personal jurisdiction doctrine “must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause rather than as a function of
federalism concerns.”143 Yet, the Court has also observed that “we
have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant
for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the
principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution.”144 
In sum, personal jurisdiction in domestic cases is designed to
protect a defendant’s right not to stand trial in a domestic forum
requirement”).
138. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
139. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
140. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2849 (2011).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2853.
143. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.13 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982)).
144. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
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with which she has no contacts. Although choice-of-law and feder-
alism concerns may remain relevant, they do not, in the end, control
the question. The question before the court is whether the defendant
is subject to suit in a given domestic forum in light of her contacts
with that forum. If she is not, then she may be sued in another
domestic forum—at a minimum, her place of domicile. Domestic
personal jurisdiction thus allocates adjudicatory authority between
the several states.145
As rich and interesting as this analysis may be at the doctrinal
level, the resulting practical realities should not be missed. In a
purely domestic case, there will be at least one forum in the United
States where a domestic defendant is subject to suit—at a mini-
mum, that defendant’s home state for purposes of general jurisdic-
tion.146 When viewed in this way, personal jurisdiction is in many
ways a question of venue. The question is can the defendant be sued
here (with the “here” being one of the several states)? If not, then
should she be sued there (with the “there” being another U.S.
forum)? A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a
domestic case, although important, is mostly a tactic of delay and
reverse forum shopping designed to transfer the case to an appropri-
ate venue from the defendant’s perspective. Although this concern
for venue protects a defendant’s due process rights, it also prevents
inappropriate forum shopping between the several states.147 A
plaintiff may seek a forum that is law favorable—so-called forum
shopping—but a defendant may equally reverse forum shop to find
a place where the locus and the law are more convenient, either in
federal or state court.148 If the plaintiff’s choice of forum, and with
145. This is not the only way to view the purpose of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, in the
Supreme Court’s most recent decision in the area, personal jurisdiction was viewed in several
different ways by different members of the Court: aimed at placing limits on sovereign
authority, J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality
opinion), focused on fairness to the defendant, id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring), or
concerned with “litigational convenience and the respective situations of the parties,” id. at
2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
146. Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728-
35 (1988).
147. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 353-54, 369-70 (2006)
(explaining that personal jurisdiction limits the dangers of forum shopping abuse by
restricting a litigant’s choices of forum).
148. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (permitting a defendant to remove a case from state
court to an appropriate federal court); Bassett, supra note 147, at 344, 362, 380-91 (explaining
1518 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1489
it choice of law, bears little relationship with the domestic defen-
dant, then a court will reject the plaintiff ’s choice in favor of the
defendant’s convenience and due process rights.149
B. Transnational Personal Jurisdiction
Transnational cases are different from domestic ones when ques-
tions of judicial jurisdiction arise. They differ from domestic cases
not only in that they have foreign parties and foreign law but they
also present different issues of litigation planning and forum choice.
To return again to the hypothetical from the previous Section, if a
Virginia plaintiff is injured in Virginia by a product manufactured
in England by an English company and sent to Virginia, is there
specific jurisdiction?150 The answer would appear to be yes because
the English corporation has targeted a Virginia domiciliary and sold
its product there.151 From this decision, however, flow other outc-
omes. First, Virginia would likely apply Virginia law to the case.152
Second, the chance that the U.S. court would dismiss the case in
favor of a foreign forum is slight.153 Finally, this simple hypothetical
makes forum choice relatively easy for a court to resolve: the plain-
tiff could either bring suit in Virginia or England, with Virginia
having an equal, if not greater, interest in the case than England.154 
the countermeasures available to defendants that allow them to forum shop through removal,
a motion to transfer venue, and forum non conveniens).
149. See Bassett, supra note 147, at 369.
150. These facts are drawn from the Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786, as discussed in what follows.
151. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980) (illustrating
that targeting of the forum is key to the analysis). 
152. For tort cases, Virginia follows the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws approach
to choice of law, which requires the rule of lex loci delicti—the law of the place of injury.
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2010: Twenty-Fourth Annual
Survey, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 303, 331 tbl.1 (2011). Note, apparently most states would apply the
law of the place of injury in this arrangement even under interest-based approaches because
of the plaintiff’s U.S. domicile and U.S. injury.
153. Forum non conveniens dismissals are unlikely when there is a domestic plaintiff. See
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
154. General jurisdiction would be appropriate in England, the defendant’s place of
incorporation, whereas specific jurisdiction would exist in Virginia. See Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011) (explaining the differences
between specific and general jurisdiction).
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However, what if the English corporation sells its products to an
independent distributor in California and that distributor then sells
the product to the Virginian? Is there specific jurisdiction over the
manufacturer in Virginia? If not, can the Virginia plaintiff bring
suit in California or must the Virginian go to England? To compli-
cate the issue further, what if the Virginian receives the product in
Virginia but is injured in France while on vacation there? To com-
plicate matters even more, what if a French plaintiff is injured in
France by a product manufactured by a Virginia corporation that is
sent to France? Can the French plaintiff sue in Delaware if the
Virginia corporation is incorporated there?155 What law will be
applied? These questions, and perhaps the reader’s reactions to
them, confirm that personal jurisdiction serves as a proxy for other
values—not just due process but also intuitions about where the
most appropriate forum is to hear a case and what the appropriate
law is to apply. 
Regardless of where one thinks the most appropriate forum is,
remember that a successful motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in a transnational case may mean that the plaintiff may
not sue in any of the several states, as a foreign defendant will not
necessarily be at home, or have any other contacts, in any of the
several states. Likewise, if a court finds personal jurisdiction, the
court may, in some cases, adjudicate claims that bear little or no
relationship to the United States because they are based on foreign
facts. For instance, if a court finds that it has general jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation then it may hear any and all claims,
including claims based on facts wholly occurring abroad, against
that corporation.156
This observation touches on an important characteristic of the
relationship between judicial jurisdiction and choice of law. Once a
court finds that it has jurisdiction it will control the case before it,
even when potentially applying foreign law. As such, it will apply
155. I note that such a case may be a prime candidate for a forum non conveniens
dismissal. I will discuss this more completely below in Part III.
156. For a recent example, with a pending petition for certiorari before the Court, see
Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 929-31 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that a
German corporation is subject to suit in the United States for human rights violations in
Argentina on account of general jurisdiction).
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the forum’s social and procedural policies.157 Doing so risks frustra-
tion of a foreign state’s policies, thereby offending foreign sover-
eigns.158
There are also other concerns that warrant careful attention in
transnational cases. As explained by Linda Silberman, 
On the one hand, there is concern that the plaintiff, if he cannot
sue the foreign defendant in the United States, may not be able
to sue at all. The burdens of travel, distance, and costs—as well
as access to a lawyer abroad—may make litigation abroad
impractical or impossible. On the other hand, a foreign defen-
dant who is sued in the United States faces burdens of cost and
distance, particularly since the U.S. system is one of the few that
requires a defendant to pay its own legal fees even if ultimately
successful. More generally, domestic institutions and attitudes
within a particular country can differ markedly from those in
foreign states, increasing the litigation burden of the foreign
defendant.159 
This realization severs the link between domestic and transna-
tional personal jurisdiction. Among other things, domestic personal
jurisdiction is arguably about venue, due process, and the allocation
of power between the several states.160 Transnational personal
jurisdiction may be about venue and due process, but the allocation
of power between the several states is not at issue. Instead, the
allocation of power between nations is at stake.161 As Austen Parrish
observes, “[W]hile jurisdictional assertions within the United States
may be unlikely to create state jealousies, those jealousies can and
do arise in the international context.”162 How due process should
intersect with transnational cases is far from clear but can be
glimpsed through the Supreme Court’s case law involving non-U.S.
defendants. 
157. Maier & McCoy, supra note 120, at 252.
158. Dimitrios Evrigenis, Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 525,
526-27 (1985).
159. Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and
Comparative Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 595-96 (2012).
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. See Parrish, supra note 114, at 55.
162. Id.
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Before this past Term, the Supreme Court’s only specific jurisdic-
tion case involving transnational elements was Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court.163 In Asahi, the Supreme Court faced
the question “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign
defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered
outside the United States would reach the forum State in the
stream of commerce constitutes ‘minimum contacts’ between the
defendant and the forum State.”164 Addressing the transnational ele-
ments in the case, the Court held in Part II(B) of Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, written for an eight-Justice majority, that due process
entails more than showing that the defendant purposefully directed
its behavior at the forum and more than demonstrating a bare
minimum of contacts between the defendant and the forum.165
Justice O’Connor’s opinion first reiterated five factors, drawn from
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,166 to be considered in all
cases—domestic and international—potentially bearing on whether
litigation in the forum is reasonable.167 The Court emphasized three
considerations in particular that would help courts identify
instances in which the assessment of reasonableness might be dif-
ferent for foreign nonresident defendants than for domestic nonres-
ident defendants. These three transnational reasonableness factors
were (1) the “procedural and substantive policies of other nations
whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction,” (2) the
“unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a
foreign legal system,” and (3) the effects of adjudicating such a case
on the foreign relations policies of the United States.168 
The Court decided Asahi in 1987, and for twenty-four years, the
Court issued no further opinions on the subject of specific jurisdic-
tion in the transnational context. The Supreme Court’s 2010 Term
provided an opportunity to clarify the doctrine. In two cases heard
in January 2011 and decided in June 2011, the Court faced the
question of when U.S. courts have personal jurisdiction over foreign
companies under general and specific jurisdiction. In Goodyear
163. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
164. Id. at 105 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
165. Id. at 113-16.
166. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
167. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
168. Id. at 114-15 (emphasis omitted).
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Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, a case involving general
jurisdiction, North Carolina plaintiffs were killed in a bus accident
in Paris, France when an allegedly defective tire manufactured by
foreign subsidiaries of Goodyear U.S.A. exploded.169 Plaintiffs al-
leged general jurisdiction in North Carolina because defendants sold
their products in the United States, including North Carolina. In J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, a case of specific jurisdiction,
a New Jersey plaintiff brought suit in New Jersey state court when
he was injured by a metal-shearing machine at work in New
Jersey.170 The machines were manufactured by an English company
in England, and the machines were distributed throughout the
United States through the manufacturer’s independent Ohio dis-
tributor.171 
In Goodyear, the Court held that general jurisdiction was lacking
given that North Carolina was not the defendant’s state of incorpo-
ration, its principal place of business, or a state that, based on the
defendant’s contacts with it, could be said to be its home.172 In so
finding, the Court did not address the transnational elements in the
case. In Nicastro, the Court held that specific jurisdiction was
lacking.173 Echoing the consideration of power explored earlier in
this Part, Justice Kennedy framed the issue as follows: 
First, personal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the
society or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the
defendant to judgment concerning that conduct. Personal juris-
diction, of course, restricts “judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” for due
process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful
power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful depends on
whether the sovereign has authority to render it.174
169. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2848 (2011).
170. 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion).
171. Id. at 2786, 2796.
172. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855-57.
173. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.
174. Id. at 2789 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 (1982)).
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What is striking about this articulation of the doctrine is that the
Justices failed to account for the transnational elements in the case.
Indeed, the Justices failed to apply Asahi’s international prongs to
the cases at bar. The case law therefore shows that the problem
with personal jurisdiction in transnational cases lies not so much
with the lack of a test—although, to be sure, contestable versions of
the test exist—but with a lack of concrete direction as to how courts
should apply the test in actual cases. Put simply, when and under
what circumstances is an alien defendant subject to personal juris-
diction in a given U.S. forum? Put another way, who is amenable to
suit in the United States for transnational harms?
Lower court opinions in this area do not do much better. In most
cases, lower courts have disregarded any precise transnational in-
quiry and have instead favored the application of the standard
domestic framework.175 Courts that have analyzed the transnational
nature of the case as a separate prong do not generally agree on how
to treat the international element. Some courts place special empha-
sis on the transnational nature of the dispute and acknowledge that
this factor is worthy of heightened scrutiny.176 Other courts down-
play the importance of the transnational nature of the dispute, and
merely acknowledge that the defendant may suffer some hardship
in litigating the case in the United States, while arriving at the res-
olution that the court’s minimum contacts analysis points toward.177
175. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL
1814111, at *2-3 (S.D. Miss. May 9, 2011), reconsideration denied, No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP,
2011 WL 4443626 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 23, 2011), and motion to certify appeal granted, No. 2:10-
CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 6291812 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011); ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v.
United Diamond Drilling Servs., Inc., No. 6:07 CV 251, 2009 WL 2834274, at *3-5 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 31, 2009); see also Local Billing, LLC v. Webbilling, No. CV 08-3083 PSG (MANx), 2008
WL 5210667, at *1-5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2008); Elayyan v. Sol Melia, SA, 571 F. Supp. 2d 886,
896 (N.D. Ind. 2008); Alliance Royalties, LLC v. Boothe, 329 S.W.3d 117, 127 (Tex. Ct. App.
2010).
176. E.g., Santora v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 694, 701
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (“[T]he burden on the defendant forced to litigate in a foreign forum is still the
primary concern.” (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980))); Jones v. Boto Co., 498 F. Supp. 2d 822, 831 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“Given the international
context in which this dispute arises, this court must also make a careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Boto.” (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987))). 
177. E.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 423, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“Plaintiffs have also presented arguably sufficient allegations that make the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over this case perfectly reasonable. Although this case would be less
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These variations often occur within the same state or circuit and
appear to depend heavily on the individual case.178 The upshot of
this case law is that, even when courts acknowledge the difficulties
of transnational cases, such difficulties seldom affect the outcome of
the case.179 Rather, the minimum contacts analysis is nearly always
dispositive.180
At bottom, scholars believe transnational cases should be treated
differently; yet, courts tend to treat them like domestic cases in
addressing questions of personal jurisdiction. To the extent trans-
burdensome for Rheinmetall to defend if it were brought in Germany, New York is ‘a major
world capital which offers central location, easy access, and extensive facilities of all kinds,’
lessening the burden.” (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir.
2000))); Pope v. Elabo GmbH, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1021 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The Court
appreciates that it must be somewhat inconvenient for a German company such as Elabo to
litigate in Minnesota.”); Etchieson v. Cent. Purchasing, LLC, 232 P.3d 301, 309 (Colo. App.
2010) (“First, we note that in the context of product liability, the limits on personal
jurisdiction have been relaxed as trade has nationalized (and, more recently, globalized) and
as modern transportation and communication have eased the burden of defending oneself in
a distant state where one engages in economic activity.” (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 293)).
178. E.g., Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.p.A., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1096-97 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (“Where, as here, the plaintiff’s showing is insufficient to establish either
purposeful availment or that the claims arise from [the] defendant’s forum-related activities,
‘the Court need not reach the third prong of the specific jurisdiction test.’” (quoting Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001))); Doe v. Geller, 533 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1008
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[L]itigation against an alien defendant creates a higher jurisdictional
barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state because important sovereignty
concerns exist.”(quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Inquirer, 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988))).
179. One of the few cases in which a court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction based
solely on unreasonableness was TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group Ltd.,
488 F.3d 1282, 1297-98 (10th Cir. 2007) (“In sum, three of the five reasonableness factors
weigh in favor of the Insurers and against exercising jurisdiction in Kansas. In addition, the
two factors that do not weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction also do not weigh in its favor.
Even though modern technology and the worldwide nature of the Insurers’ business minimize
the burden of litigating in a foreign forum, they do not completely remove the burden. And
although Kansas has an interest in providing a forum for resolution of its resident’s dispute,
this factor ultimately does not weigh in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction because the law
of the Netherlands, not Kansas, will govern the dispute. Because the Insurers have limited
contacts with Kansas, they need not make a strong showing of unreasonableness to defeat
personal jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the Insurers would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”).
180. See, e.g., Illustro Sys. Int’l, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:06-CV-1969-L., 2007
WL 1321825, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2007) (“[O]nce minimum contacts are established, a
defendant must present ‘a compelling case that the presence of some consideration would
render jurisdiction unreasonable.’” (quoting Eviro Petroleum, Inc. v. Kondur Petroleum, 79
F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D. Tex. 1999))).
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national cases are treated differently, the Court has never explained
how lower courts, both federal and state, should analyze the trans-
national elements in the case. The courts are thus in need of con-
crete guidance.
C. Critical Evaluation: The Impact of Choice of Law
As already alluded to, transnational cases are different from
domestic cases when a personal jurisdiction motion is filed.
Transnational cases involve foreign individuals and foreign cor-
porations as defendants; they also involve foreign law. If these
individuals and corporations are not amenable to suit in a U.S.
forum then the likelihood of suing the individual or corporation
substantially diminishes. That is so because foreign defendants are
often either amenable to suit in a given U.S. forum or not amenable
at all to suit in the United States, unless contacts can be aggregated
in a federal question case.181 To the extent that a foreign defendant
is not amenable to suit in the United States, many plaintiffs will not
refile in a foreign forum.182 Thus, the motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction in a U.S. forum is critical to the case. 
This realization dovetails with another important facet of modern
personal jurisdiction litigation in the case of non-U.S. defendants.
Plaintiffs do not bring transnational suits in the United States
against foreign defendants simply because courts have jurisdiction
here; they bring suit because the underlying substantive law is more
favorable to their claims.183 In other words, personal jurisdiction in
transnational cases is not about jurisdiction per se but about choice
of law. A plaintiff would certainly not bring a transnational suit in
the United States solely for the purpose of securing jurisdiction over
a foreign defendant when a U.S. court would apply a law that would
necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case. The personal jurisdiction de-
termination in most transnational cases is, therefore, not about
personal jurisdiction in the abstract but about what law a U.S. court
181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
182. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather
Fantastic Fiction,” 103 L.Q. REV. 398, 418-20 (1987).
183. See Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum
Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1391 & n.123
(2004). 
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will choose to apply against a certain defendant in the transnational
case at bar.184
Surprisingly, the connection between personal jurisdiction and
choice of law is underanalyzed in the scholarly literature, especially
in transnational cases.185 This is partially due to the Supreme Court,
which has stated on multiple occasions in dicta that personal juris-
diction and choice of law are separate inquiries.186 In these cases,
however, the personal jurisdiction discussion was about a domestic
case and not about a transnational case.187 These cases thus reflect
the realization that in domestic cases constitutional doctrines such
as full faith and credit provide checks on the ability of a plaintiff to
sue a multistate corporation. More so, these statements do not ac-
count for the burgeoning litigation reality that most transnational
cases are resolved on the basis of forum non conveniens motions
even before the determination of jurisdiction.188 This development
shows that U.S. courts recognize that choice of law is perhaps the
major inquiry in many transnational cases.189 Put simply, courts
reach many personal jurisdiction determinations by examining
choice of law through other doctrines like forum non conveniens.
Personal jurisdiction is thus a secondary factor in many transna-
tional cases and a proxy for choice of law.
Recourse to choice of law is illuminating. The historical develop-
ment of the personal jurisdiction doctrine occurred when the choice-
of-law process had settled on certain jurisdiction-selecting rules
184. See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33,
88 (1978) (noting that focusing only on forum issues and not choice of law amounts to being
concerned with where a person will be hanged rather than whether she should be hanged at
all).
185. Most of the scholarship connecting the doctrines is concerned with purely domestic
cases. See Alfred Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 960, 960-62 (1981); Maier & McCoy, supra note 120, at 256; Martin, supra note 127, at
873-75; Courtland H. Peterson, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 37, 37-40 (1988); Robert Allen Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law:
The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1031, 1032-34 (1978).
186. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481 (1985); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 254 (1958); see also Perdue, supra note 114, at 529-31 (explaining Supreme Court
personal jurisdiction case law in full).
187. E.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-68; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238.
188. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007)
(permitting this sequencing). 
189. See Childress, supra note 13, at 1563-64 (providing empirical support regarding the
relevance of choice of law).
2013] RETHINKING LEGAL GLOBALIZATION 1527
under the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws that sought to
provide clear answers to conflicts questions.190 So, for instance, if a
Virginia citizen sued a North Carolina citizen in a Virginia court for
a tort that occurred in North Carolina, the Virginia court, assuming
it had jurisdiction, would apply North Carolina law.191 The Virginia
court’s application of North Carolina law raises issues of interstate
relations and federalism. Most notably, there is the question of
whether the Virginia court should adjudicate a case or controversy
occurring outside of its territory. If the North Carolina defendant is
found in Virginia or consents to jurisdiction, then the federalism
question is resolved through conflict-of-laws rules that grant the
North Carolina defendant similar treatment, subject to constitu-
tional provisions. However, given the fact that during the historical
development of the doctrine mobility was limited, the case would be
localized in North Carolina, affording North Carolina courts the
ability to determine questions of their own law.
Judicial power is not about power in the abstract but is about the
power to declare law. The power to declare law presupposes that a
court has the power to choose a certain law, over all others, to
govern a case or controversy. As such, the choice-of-law analysis
should be connected to the personal jurisdiction analysis. If courts
do not declare law in the abstract, then they must choose between
laws to determine whether, and in what circumstances, one law or
the other governs a case. This leads to the realization that choice of
law is not incident to the personal jurisdiction analysis but inextri-
cably connected to it. To put it a slightly different way, the question
in cases of judicial jurisdiction should be: “May this decision maker
select among the various competing policies reflected in choice of
law and local law rules to determine the outcome in this case
between these parties?”192 Personal jurisdiction “is not merely the
assertion of the right to decide the case between the parties at a
given geographical location .... Rather, selection of the forum selects
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (“The place of wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place.”); id. § 378 (“The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained
a legal injury.”). See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
(detailing the history of conflicts at law and solutions offered by the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws).
191. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-378.
192. Maier & McCoy, supra note 120, at 255.
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an entire decision making regime.”193 As such, personal jurisdiction
is really a proxy for choice of law. 
Although courts consider choice-of-law concerns when evaluating
whether a transnational case should be filed here, they do not
address these issues through personal jurisdiction analysis. Rather,
they do so through the forum non conveniens doctrine, which is the
subject of the next Part.
III. TRANSNATIONAL FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In this Part, the Article illustrates how forum non conveniens
motions serve as a proxy for both determinations of personal
jurisdiction and choice of law and how such a short circuiting of the
choice-of-law process may lead to an access-to-justice gap. After de-
scribing the doctrine’s scope, this Part analyzes its impact in federal
and state courts by documenting new empirical evidence on courts’
use of the doctrine. Finally, this Part considers the doctrine’s impli-
cations for a theory of personal jurisdiction that encapsulates choice
of law.
A. The Doctrine’s Scope
Forum non conveniens plays a unique role in transnational cases
by permitting U.S. courts to allocate adjudicatory authority between
the various countries that impact a court’s decision. According to the
Supreme Court, the “doctrine of forum non conveniens has a long
history.”194 The doctrine as we know it—not as a doctrine of comity
or abstention but as a concrete, multifactored test—is, however, of
relatively recent vintage. The modern doctrine traces its roots in the
United States to a law review article published by a New York law
firm associate in 1929.195 According to one commentator, “Not until
1948 was the doctrine accepted for general application in the federal
courts, and it received little or no attention in the state courts until
after the federal adoption.”196 This application and adoption was due
193. Id.
194. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (italics omitted).
195. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
196. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine,
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in large part to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert.197
In Gulf Oil, a Virginia plaintiff sued a Pennsylvania defendant
corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York for alleged negligence occurring in Virginia.198 The cor-
poration was registered to do business in New York and Virginia,
and thus there was personal jurisdiction in New York.199 Because all
the conduct giving rise to the litigation occurred in Virginia and
because the witnesses and evidence were there, the district court
dismissed the case on grounds of forum non conveniens.200 On
appeal, the Supreme Court found no error in the dismissal.201
According to the Court, the forum non conveniens doctrine empow-
ers a federal district court to dismiss a case in favor of another
court—here, another U.S. court—even when jurisdiction and venue
are established, when private and public interest factors weigh in
favor of another adequate forum.202
The Court detailed the factors for balancing as follows. The
private factors include: 
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises,  if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 796 (1985).
197. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). A companion case, Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co., which the Court decided the same day, stated different facts but the same legal
principles. 330 U.S. 518, 519-21, 531-32 (1947). Although the Court did not mention the
doctrine by name, one precursor appeared in Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships,
Ltd., in which Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, stated the following: “Courts of equity
and of law occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the
suit is between aliens or non-residents or where for kindred reasons the litigation can more
appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.” 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932). The doctrine arose
mostly in the admiralty context, although some state court case law supported a broader
doctrine outside of the admiralty context, BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 54, at 347-49 & n.14,
as did the Court’s opinion in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 124-26,
129 (1904). 
198. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 502-03.
199. See id. at 503.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 512.
202. See id. at 504.
1530 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1489
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained.203 
The public interest factors include:
[a]dministrative difficulties ... for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin;
[j]ury duty [a]s a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the
people of a community which has no relation to the litigation; ...
[the] local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home [; and finally, the] appropriateness ... in having the trial of
a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law
that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law
foreign to itself.204
According to the Court, such discretion was to be used judiciously:
“[U]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plain-
tiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”205 In the domestic
forum non conveniens context as outlined in Gulf Oil, the plaintiff’s
choice of forum should be disturbed only in limited circumstances.206
Such limited circumstances would appear to be those cases in which
the plaintiff’s choice of an inconvenient forum causes injustice to the
defendant by forcing litigation in a forum with little or no nexus to
the case at bar, and thereby compromises the defendant’s ability to
mount an appropriate defense.207
To return again to a hypothetical, if a Virginia plaintiff is injured
by a product manufactured and distributed by an English corpora-
tion as part of a targeted plan to market products in Virginia, the
plaintiff may file the case in Virginia based on specific jurisdiction.
The defendant may respond, however, with a forum non conveniens
203. Id. at 508.
204. Id. at 508-09.
205. Id. at 508.
206. Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in Federal
Statutory Cases, 49 EMORY L.J. 1137, 1153 (2000). Note, however, the passage of the federal
transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006), has rendered the domestic forum non conveniens
analysis in federal cases obsolete.
207. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1947).
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motion and argue that the case should instead be heard in England.
What should the court do?
The answer to the hypothetical presented above would appear to
be that the motion should be denied and the case should be heard
in Virginia unless the defendant can show that convenience weighs
in favor of hearing the case in England. What if, however, an
English plaintiff wishes to sue a German corporation for injuries
sustained in England in a Virginia court, where for the sake of argu-
ment, the German corporation would be subject to specific jurisdic-
tion? Or, what if an English plaintiff wishes to sue a Virginia
defendant in Virginia for injuries occurring in England?
The rule for such cases follows the Supreme Court’s decision in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, which explicitly applied the doctrine in
the transnational context.208 In that case, Scottish plaintiffs brought
a wrongful death action in California state court against two
American defendants who had manufactured the engine and pro-
pellers of a plane that crashed in Scotland.209 The defendants re-
moved the case to California federal court and then transferred the
case to a Pennsylvania federal court, where they then moved for
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds.210 The district court
granted dismissal in favor of a Scottish forum, and the Third Circuit
reversed, finding that dismissal was inappropriate because Scottish
law was less favorable to the plaintiff.211 
The Supreme Court reversed212 and clarified the doctrine in two
important ways as applied in transnational cases. First, in evaluat-
ing the above Gulf Oil factors, when a plaintiff chooses her home
forum, “it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient.”213
Yet, “[w]hen the plaintiff is foreign, ... this assumption is much less
reasonable.”214 In short, “a foreign plaintiff’s choice [of forum]
deserves less deference” than a domestic plaintiff’s choice.215 Second,
the Court explained that an unfavorable change in law, should a
208. 454 U.S. 235, 238 (1981).
209. Id. at 238-40.
210. Id. at 240-41.
211. Id. at 241-46.
212. Id. at 261.
213. Id. at 255-56.
214. Id. at 256.
215. Id. 
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case be sent to a foreign jurisdiction, does not by itself bar dismissal
on forum non conveniens grounds.216
In light of these rules, the answer to the above hypotheticals with
English plaintiffs would appear to be that the district court may
dismiss both cases in favor of an adequate alternative foreign forum
(1) because the foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum is due less defer-
ence, and (2) because of complex choice-of-law issues. In Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., the
Court’s most recent foray into the doctrine, the Court explained that
a court may dismiss a case under forum non conveniens without
even determining whether it has jurisdiction.217 So, a reasonable
defendant, when faced with a forum-shopping plaintiff’s choice of an
inconvenient and law-unfriendly forum, will herself reverse forum
shop to find a more convenient and law-friendly foreign forum, with
the hope that the plaintiff may never refile the case.218
It is important to remember that the private and public interest
factors are only guideposts and the Supreme Court has declined to
catalogue all of the circumstances when dismissal would be
proper.219 Although it is hard to precisely identify a hierarchy of
factors compelling dismissal, one of the leading rationales is that
transnational cases require complicated applications of foreign
law.220 Indeed, many lower federal courts have given this factor sub-
stantial and decisive weight in the forum non conveniens analysis.221
Though this factor is not conclusive,222 the Court has emphasized
that the doctrine “is designed in part to help courts avoid conducting
complex exercises in comparative law.... [T]he public interest factors
point towards dismissal where the court would be required to ‘un-
tangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.’”223
Another important factor is whether the plaintiff is domestic or
foreign. One recent empirical study concludes that “foreign plaintiffs
are twice as likely to have their suits dismissed” compared to
216. Id. at 254-55.
217. 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007).
218. See Robertson, supra note 182, at 418-20.
219. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
220. See id. at 509.
221. E.g., Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1234 (2d
Cir. 1996); Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
222. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981).
223. Id. at 251 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509).
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domestic plaintiffs.224 In other words, foreign plaintiffs pleading
foreign law even against domestic defendants may not have access
to a U.S. forum.
The upshot of this case law is that a court is vested with wide
discretion to dismiss a case with foreign elements, especially when
a foreign plaintiff and foreign law are involved.225 In the federal
system, appellate courts review such decisions based on an abuse of
discretion standard, which confirms the discretion vested in district
courts to resolve these motions.226 The impact of such a decision to
dismiss is consequential. Unlike a domestic transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), a forum non conveniens dismissal ends the case
and may, in some cases, end the case permanently in the United
States, as evidence suggests that most forum non conveniens dis-
missals are never refiled in a foreign forum.227 Intriguingly, a forum
non conveniens dismissal is generally not subject to preclusive effect
as it is not a judgment on the merits.228 The current state of case
law, however, indicates that although not preclusive of filing suit in
another federal district or in a state court, an initial forum non
conveniens decision in many cases will be respected by another U.S.
court for similar reasons given by the dismissing court.229 As such,
a plaintiff gets one shot at having her case heard here, and if it is
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds, the plaintiff must go
abroad to have the case heard.
224. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503-04.
225. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 257. 
226. Id. But see, e.g., Bos. Telecomms. Grp., Inc. v. Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir.
2009) (“Here, the district court abused its discretion in holding that this private interest factor
was neutral when Wood provided very little information that would have enabled the district
court to understand why various witnesses were material to his defense.”); Reid-Walen v.
Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1401 (8th Cir. 1991) (“We conclude that the district court erred in
granting a dismissal based on forum non conveniens. Proper deference to the plaintiff’s forum
choice, where the defendants reside, coupled with the proper weighing of the Gilbert factors,
requires reversal.”).
227. Robertson, supra note 182, at 418-20.
228. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007).
229. See Exxon Corp. v. Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 486
U.S. 140 (1988). 
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B. The Relationship to Choice of Law
It has been noted that “the last thirty years have seen a growing
torrent of ... cases [filed in the United States with i]nternational and
foreign issues.”230 This growth may be due in part to a foreign
plaintiff’s ability to forum shop her way into a U.S. court, in hopes
of finding a more favorable forum to litigate her case.231 Alienage
jurisdiction232 and permissive personal jurisdiction doctrines233
afford foreign plaintiffs the opportunity to choose among various
U.S. courts in which to file their cases.234 This gives plaintiffs the
choice of various conflict-of-laws rules leading to various substantive
laws. A plaintiff would thus compare the conflict-of-laws rules of
several states, determine which rule would require the federal court
sitting in diversity to apply the most favorable substantive law, be
it foreign or domestic, and then file suit in the most favorable
court.235
For example, a foreign plaintiff harmed by a defendant United
States company operating abroad may have the benefit of various
United States fora in which to file suit, assuming the defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction and venue in those fora. Because
Supreme Court precedent requires federal courts’ application of
230. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS, at v
(2008).
231. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic
Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007) (“[M]odern
choice-of-law approaches give plaintiffs an incentive to sue in a forum that has more generous
tort laws than the place of injury.”).
232. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006).
233. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); VON MEHREN, supra
note 115, at 163 (“The analysis [in International Shoe] increases the number of available
forums, with the result that ordinarily a plaintiff’s forum is produced.”).
234. Although both domestic and foreign plaintiffs may request the court’s application of
foreign law, domestic plaintiffs are less likely to do so. Cf. Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of
Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009) (“[S]trong
biases favor[ ] domestic over foreign law, domestic over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over
defendants.”(footnote omitted)). But see id. at 722 (arguing that supporters of the “strong bias”
view “underestimate the influence of choice-of-law doctrine on judges’ decisions and
overestimate the extent of bias in those decisions”). Whytock eventually concludes that
empirical evidence suggests that there is little bias in the context of international tort claims.
Id.
235. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 58-59 (Martha
Minow et al. eds., 1992) (explaining the “strategic behavior entailed in forum shopping”).
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state conflict-of-laws rules,236 a plaintiff will compare the conflicts
rules in the potential fora in search of the most favorable conflicts
law that would lead to the most favorable substantive law. So, for
example, a foreign plaintiff hoping to have foreign law applied to an
injury sustained abroad might choose to file a lawsuit against a
California corporation in Virginia or another state that still follows
the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws,237 where the conflict-of-
laws rules would direct the federal court to the place of the injury
and thus foreign law.238 The plaintiff would therefore choose to
forum shop away from California’s “comparative impairment” ap-
proach239 if Virginia’s conflicts rules were more favorable to the
plaintiff and resulted in the application of favorable substantive law
to the plaintiff’s case.240 Of course, a plaintiff might in fact prefer to
have California’s conflicts rules applied if foreign law is not helpful
to her claim, because California’s rules might direct the application
of California law or some other better substantive law. Such a choice
would encourage forum shopping away from the Virginia courts. 
In this way, the forum non conveniens doctrine and choice of law
overlap as part of a unified theory designed to prevent forum
shopping. Courts resolve this very problem of forum shopping not
through the application or nonapplication of foreign substantive law
236. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
237. See Symeonides, supra note 152, at 231-32 tbl.1 (listing the conflict-of-laws rules of
the several states).
238. See, e.g., Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809, 823 (E.D. Va. 1981) (“[T]he
Virginia rule in personal injury actions is that the law of the place of the injury, the lex loci
delecti, will control. Since plaintiffs’ injuries were incurred in England, the laws of that
country must be applied in the present cases.” (citation omitted)); see also Dunham v. Hotelera
Canco S.A. de C.V., 933 F. Supp. 543, 555 (E.D. Va. 1996) (same approach).
239. See, e.g., Pubali Bank v. City Nat’l Bank, 777 F.2d 1340, 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding under California’s “comparative impairment test” that California had the greatest
interest in a breach of contract and fraud action brought by a foreign bank against a
California bank, and thus California law applied); Marsh v. Burrell, 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1497-
1502 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same approach).
240. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 147, at 383 (“The law regularly provides more than one
authorized, legitimate forum.... To shop among those legitimate choices for the forum that
offers the potential for the most favorable outcome is the only rational decision under rational
choice theory and game theory because forum shopping maximizes the client’s expected
payoff.”); Ghei & Parisi, supra note 183, at 1372 (“[P]laintiffs will generally seek to file claims
in jurisdictions where the expected net gain is the largest. The amount of litigation is likely
to be positively correlated with the extent to which the jurisdiction’s laws favor plaintiffs.”).
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(the question of choice of law) but through the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.241
C. The Doctrine’s Impact
This realization makes scrutiny of the doctrine’s present-day
impact important and timely. If courts utilize the doctrine, they
have the potential to deny litigants access to a forum, perhaps the
only reasonable forum, in their case. This may mean that the forum
non conveniens doctrine creates an access-to-justice gap in transna-
tional cases. To examine this claim, this Section is divided into two
Subsections that each examine new empirical research conducted
for this Article: the doctrine’s impact in federal courts and the
doctrine’s impact in state courts.242
1. Federal Impact
A significant increase in forum non conveniens decisions in
federal courts has occurred in recent years.243 Between 1990 and
2005, reports show roughly 691—about 43 per year—transnational
forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.244 Overall, the
courts dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 47% of these
cases.245 In cases involving a foreign plaintiff, the dismissal rate was
241. See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury
Paradox, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 87, 87 (2009) (“Federal judges subject forum choice in
transnational tort actions to exacting scrutiny, routinely dismissing such claims on forum non
conveniens grounds with no examination of the state interests at stake.”).
242. Part III.C develops arguments regarding forum choice that are explored in different
ways in Donald Earl Childress III, Forum Conveniens: The Search for a Convenient Forum in
Transnational Cases, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 157, 168-72 (2012).
243. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51
B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (2010).
244. Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033.
245. Id. at 16 & tbl.1.
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higher, at 63%.246 Foreign plaintiffs are “twice as likely to have their
suits dismissed” compared to domestic plaintiffs.247 
Forum non conveniens motions are likely to increase in future
years in light of recent Supreme Court precedent encouraging the
doctrine’s use.248 A search of cases invoking the doctrine after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia
International Shipping Corp.249 confirms that motions to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens may be on the rise. Although the
most recent study of the subject showed about a 50% dismissal rate
for the period between 1990 and 2005,250 which was before the
Court’s Sinochem decision, the analysis conducted for this Article
starting in 2007, after the Court decided Sinochem, presents a more
nuanced picture.251
Since Sinochem, 94 reported cases have raised the issue, or about
24 per year. Of those, 48% were dismissed. Of these dismissals, 82%
explicitly recognized that a reason for dismissal was the application
of foreign law. When foreign plaintiffs were involved, the numbers
tell a slightly different story. Since Sinochem, 56 of the 94 cases,
nearly 60%, involved foreign plaintiffs. Of these cases, the dismissal
rate was 52%. 
246. Whytock, supra note 10, at 503 & tbl.1. This is likely accounted for by the fact that in
conducting the forum non conveniens analysis a court may give less deference to a foreign
plaintiff’s choice of forum under Supreme Court case law. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is reasonable to assume that
this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that
the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”). Although not my
concern here, I note that such a demonstrated disparity between domestic and foreign
plaintiffs may itself have implications for U.S. foreign relations. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra
note 54, at 378-80 (noting that a failure to afford equal access to the courts may violate
various treaties to which the United States is a signatory); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281-82 (5th ed. 2006) (same).
247. Whytock, supra note 10, at 504.
248. See Robertson, supra note 243, at 1088-89.
249. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
250. Whytock, supra note 244, at 16 & tbl.1.
251. In short, the approach was as follows: First, the Westlaw database was searched for
all U.S. district court cases raising the term “forum non conveniens” between March 5, 2007
(the date of the Sinochem decision) and January 1, 2012. Second, all decisions were reviewed
and cases that were not actual decisions by U.S. federal district courts granting or denying
a forum non conveniens motion in favor of a foreign forum were discarded. Third, these cases
were analyzed to yield the results explained in the text.
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These numbers likely underreport the real impact of the doctrine
on cases before the federal courts. Since 2007, courts have increas-
ingly dealt with these issues through unpublished opinions—going
from reporting 45% of these cases in 2007 to only 17% in 2011.252
Indeed, during the timeframe of the most recent study, the report-
ing rate was closer to 45%.253 Although the dismissal rate for
unpublished decisions hovered around 51%, what is striking is that
261 such cases came after Sinochem. Of these unreported cases,
75%  explicitly recognized the application of foreign law as a reason
for dismissal. When foreign plaintiffs were involved, which repre-
sents 102 of these cases, the dismissal rate jumped to 71%. In sum,
courts have decided approximately 355 cases—reported and
unreported—since Sinochem, with an average of 78.5% of cases
recognizing foreign law as an important factor in dismissal. One
hundred fifty-eight of these cases involved foreign plaintiffs, with
the average dismissal rate of reported and unreported cases being
62%.254 Therefore, courts may be resisting application of foreign law
through the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the trend to do so
is growing as courts push such decisions to unreported cases.
Based on these numbers, several observations can be offered.
First, historical notions of litigation convenience are being sub-
sumed as questions of choice of law, especially in cases in which a
foreign plaintiff is involved. In other words, when a federal court is
asked to adjudicate a foreign plaintiff’s case and foreign law is
arguably applicable, the trend is to dismiss in favor of a foreign
forum. Second, this approach may accentuate concerns of choice of
law over convenience. Federal courts perhaps recognize that U.S.
courts are ill equipped to adjudicate cases of foreign law. Such
adjudication may needlessly enmesh U.S. courts in foreign sover-
252. These statistics were reached by comparing the number of published cases to
unpublished cases during the relevant time period. They suffer from some incompleteness for
lack of a good denominator because not all published and unpublished cases are included in
the available databases. In short, estimating publication rates based on current databases is
complicated.
253. This number was reached by comparing the number of published cases to unpublished
cases during the time of Whytock’s study of decisions: 1990 to 2005. See Whytock, supra note
244, at 14-17. This statistic also suffers from some incompleteness for the same reason. See
supra note 252.
254. See supra notes 251-52 for methodology.
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eigns’ public policy; as a result, the trend appears to be for federal
courts to encourage suits to be brought in foreign courts.
Of course, the decision to bring a case domestically may be due in
part to a plaintiff’s forum-shopping decision to avail herself of more
favorable U.S. law and procedural rules. Another reason such a
decision may be made is the United States will be the locus of later
enforcement of judgment proceedings. Surprisingly, courts have
given little attention to the issue of enforcement in their analyses,
even though the Supreme Court has explained enforcement as one
of the factors for consideration.255 This evidence gives reason to
believe that convenience, one of the ostensible reasons for the
doctrine,256 is a primary concern for federal courts.
2. State Impact
Most state courts have recognized the forum non conveniens
doctrine in some fashion as a matter of common law.257 While doing
so as a matter of state law, most courts have cited federal authority
in adopting the doctrine and follow a rule of decision closely aligned
with the Gulf Oil and Piper factors discussed above.258 According to
Martin Davies, “Thirty states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S.
territories engage in an analysis effectively identical to that under-
taken in federal courts, and thirteen other states employ a factor-
based analysis very similar to [federal law].”259 Some outliers exist.
For instance, Delaware courts apply an “overwhelming hardship”
test, which is more stringent than the federal standard.260 Montana
courts reject the doctrine outright in most cases.261
Let me begin with a disclaimer. Reviewing state court forum non
conveniens decisions is incredibly difficult. Many state court trial
255. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
256. E.g., id. at 513.
257. E.g., AT&T Corp. v. Sigala, 549 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (Ga. 2001) (discussing the
doctrine’s status).
258. See supra notes 203-07, 212-16 and accompanying text.
259. Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL.
L. REV. 309, 315 (2002) (footnote omitted).
260. See, e.g., Candlewood Timber Grp., LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 998
(Del. 2004).
261. See State ex rel. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. District Court, 891 P.2d 493, 499-500 (Mont.
1995).
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decisions are not reported in research databases like Westlaw, and
this makes the sample size incredibly small and hard to analyze in
terms of impact. With this qualifier, since Sinochem, 8 reported
cases have raised the issue (about 2 per year). Of those, 88% were
dismissed.262 In terms of unreported cases, there have been 16 since
2007 (about 4 per year). Of those, 44% were dismissed. There were
thus only 24 total cases. These 24 cases came from the following
states: New York (13); Delaware (3); California (3); Connecticut (1);
Arizona (1); Indiana (1); West Virginia (1); and Massachusetts (1). 
Given that more state appellate court decisions are available on
Westlaw, one would have to trace the appellate decisions backwards
to figure out when and how the trial court decided the forum non
conveniens issue to get a more complete picture. Even doing this,
the data would be incomplete, as there is no publication of many
state appellate court decisions. Based on a preliminary review of the
state court appellate decisions, taking these decisions into account
would add anywhere from 2 to 10 additional cases per year depend-
ing on the year.
When compared to federal cases, the numbers provide some in-
formation that would be a worthwhile subject for further study.
Federal forum non conveniens cases have gone up 55% in the past
four years. The number of forum non conveniens cases occurring in
state court appear to have remained the same. Dismissal rates are
even more telling. Federal dismissal seems to hover around 50%,
whereas state court dismissal, at least in reported cases, is as high
as 88%. Given the small sample size, however, these numbers do not
provide a complete picture.
These numbers certainly underreport the real impact of the
doctrine on cases before the state courts. Interestingly, it appears
that there are more state forum non conveniens cases in New York
than in other states. This might suggest that more transnational
cases are being filed in New York, or that the defendant’s choice to
move for forum non conveniens is forum-specific to that state. It also
262. In short, the approach was as follows: First, the Westlaw database was searched for
all state court cases raising the term “forum non conveniens” between March 5, 2007 (the date
of the Sinochem decision) and January 1, 2012. Second, all decisions were then reviewed and
cases that were not actual decisions by state courts granting or denying a forum non
conveniens motion in favor of a foreign forum were discarded. Third, these cases were then
analyzed to yield the results explained in the text above.
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might mean that New York state courts have a better system of
reporting cases.
One other observation is in order. As noted previously, many
courts conclude that the application of foreign law is an important
reason in granting a forum non conveniens motion. Some states,
particularly Delaware, deny forum non conveniens motions even if
application of foreign law is likely. They do this by suggesting in
their analysis that application of foreign law is not that important,
arguing that it is common for courts to wrestle with such ques-
tions.263 Clearly, more work remains to be done in determining the
total impact of forum non conveniens on cases filed in state courts.
D. Transnational Impact
When one compares the domestic and transnational analyses, the
result is striking. First, domestic personal jurisdiction dismissals do
not necessarily end the case; they merely delay the case or encour-
age the filing of the case in another United States court.264 Second,
transnational dismissals do amount to a closing of United States
courts to a case, although many of these cases come back to the
United States as enforcement of judgment proceedings.265 However,
when they come back, a court’s ability to review the case in full is
limited, with deference given to the foreign court.266 Third, transna-
tional cases that are dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds
illustrate the importance of choice of law. Importantly, federal
courts see choice of law as a reason to dismiss the case in favor of a
foreign forum.267 As such, the choice-of-law analysis is not fully
engaged.
The historical development of personal jurisdiction occurred when
courts began employing relatively clear jurisdiction-selecting rules
to localize a suit in domestic cases. At the time International Shoe
263. See, e.g., Lisa, S.A. v. Mayorga, 993 A.2d 1042, 1047-49 (Del. 2010).
264. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
265. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 100, at 1451 (explaining “boomerang litigation”
in forum non conveniens dismissals, in which “litigation that begins in the United States
moves to a foreign judiciary, only to return once again to a U.S. court”).
266. See, e.g., Van Den Biggelaar v. Wagner, 978 F. Supp. 848, 858, 861 (N.D. Ind. 1997)
(finding the judgment of the Dutch Court of Appeals enforceable and noting that “a domestic
court normally will give effect to executive, legislative, and judicial acts of a foreign nation”).
267. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947).
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was decided, conflict-of-laws approaches throughout the United
States had coalesced around widely accepted rules, resulting in little
difference from forum to forum as to which state’s substantive law
should govern.268 All things being equal, therefore, whether a
Virginia plaintiff injured in Virginia filed her case against a
California corporation in Virginia or California was immaterial
because, under the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, Virginia
law would apply.269 Viewed in this light, a plaintiff had little incen-
tive to forum shop because “[a]s long as the rules [of the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws were] applied consistently, the same
substantive law should apply to identical facts, resulting in identical
outcomes” no matter where the plaintiff filed the case.270 The only
arguable incentive would be convenience, and thus personal juris-
diction was merely a question of venue.
Transnational cases, especially those occurring under modern
choice-of-law theories, are different. Modern-day permissive doc-
trines of personal jurisdiction dovetail with permissive choice-of-law
doctrines that allow a forum court in many cases to apply forum law
to a case or controversy even when the acts or omissions complained
of occur outside of the forum.271 So, for instance, when a California
plaintiff sues a French defendant in California, if the California
court determines that it has jurisdiction it may similarly determine
that California law is applicable to the case. This creates significant
problems.
First, how appropriate is application of California law to a case
whose contacts are mostly with a foreign state? Second, in so doing,
does the California court risk implicating foreign relations concerns?
Third, does the extraterritorial application of California law impose
California law on a foreign sovereign?
268. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement (First) of
Conflict of Laws); see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical
Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 357 (1992) (stating that the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws “commanded a nearly universal following” from its publication in 1934 until 1963).
269. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
270. Ghei & Parisi, supra note 183, at 1374. But see Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping,
Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 559 (1989) (noting that escape devices might
permit judges to deviate from these clear and consistent rules).
271. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 231, at 1137 (explaining that the “one
unmistakable consequence” of modern choice-of-law rules is that forum courts are more likely
to apply local tort law to actions that occurred in another jurisdiction).
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On account of these concerns, United States courts’ use of forum
non conveniens is not surprising. At best, it is a way to respect the
foreign nature of the proceeding and give due regard to the sover-
eignty of another state to resolve a dispute. At worst, the use of
forum non conveniens may risk inhibiting plaintiffs’ access to justice
by denying them a United States forum and potentially denying
plaintiffs the benefit of any law to resolve their claims; in many
circumstances foreign law will not recognize a claim or will provide
fewer damages and other procedural options, such as discovery and
contingency fees, that incentivize plaintiffs to bring claims.272
At bottom, the Supreme Court has created a personal jurisdiction
doctrine that provides very few limits on a court’s ability to exercise
jurisdiction over an alien defendant.273 As a result, courts have
created a doctrine of forum non conveniens that seeks to balance the
appropriateness of a court exercising jurisdiction in an individual
case. The forum non conveniens analysis is a proxy for the choice-of-
law analysis. As such, it covers up important questions of the rela-
tionship between United States law and United States courts in
applying law to foreign facts and parties. This realization encour-
ages a reconnection of choice-of-law with personal jurisdiction, and
that is the subject of the next Part.
IV. COMMON THEMES FOR TRANSNATIONAL PROBLEMS
In this Part, I provide a suggested approach to guide courts in
resolving personal jurisdiction issues in transnational cases,
especially cases involving alien defendants. After first explaining
common themes present in transnational cases, I put forward a new
approach to transnational personal jurisdiction grounded in choice
of law.
A. The Relevance of Choice of Law
The connection between personal jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens, and choice of law is, unfortunately, a connection that
272. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18 (1981) (explaining
advantages of litigating in the United States for international plaintiffs).
273. See supra Part II.B.
1544 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1489
the Supreme Court has resisted. To the extent it has been ad-
dressed, the Court has emphasized that the doctrines should be
analytically separated.274 However, a close relationship exists be-
tween personal jurisdiction and choice of law.275 As Justice Black
explained in his Hanson v. Denckla dissent, although the questions
of personal jurisdiction and choice of law may be different, “the two
are often closely related and to a substantial degree depend upon
similar considerations.”276 Justice Brennan went so far as to connect
the choice-of-law inquiry to personal jurisdiction’s reasonableness
inquiry when he stated that “the decision that it is fair to bind a
defendant by a State’s laws and rules should prove to be highly
relevant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept
jurisdiction for adjudicating the controversy.”277 Justice Brennan
has further recognized a key observation of this Article: “[T]oday
there is an interaction among rules governing jurisdiction, forum
non conveniens, and choice of law.”278 Finally, Justice Ginsburg
explained in her recent Nicastro dissent that “litigational conve-
nience and choice-of-law considerations” contribute to it being “fair
and reasonable ... to require the international seller to defend at the
place its products cause injury[,]” because a foreign corporation’s
compliance with the laws of the jurisdiction in which its products
are used is “a reasonable cost of transacting business internation-
ally.”279 These statements give room to situate transnational
274. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (“The issue is personal
jurisdiction, not choice of law.”).
275. See supra Parts II-III.
276. 357 U.S. at 258 (Black, J., dissenting).
277. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1997) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
278. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 635 n.9 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
279. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2800-01 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens also acknowledged that a court should consider
personal jurisdiction and choice of law separately, although each protects the same
interests—state sovereignty and fairness to the litigants. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 320 n.3 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Over the years, scholars too have argued for a
separate and more rigorous choice-of-law analysis in cases involving foreign defendants. See,
e.g., Martin, supra note 127 (arguing that a contacts-based test, similar to that used in a
personal jurisdiction inquiry, in which the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum and the forum’s
contacts with the facutal elements of the case are analyzed, should be employed in a choice-of-
law analysis to ensure fairness to the defendant). Other scholars have also argued that the
current personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law inquiry regime creates an unfair and
untenable litigation risk for foreign defendants. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams, Preemption:
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personal jurisdiction within a broader framework concerned with
choice of law.
Problematically, the Court in its recent decision in Sinochem
dealt with the question of whether a district court could resolve a
forum non conveniens motion in advance of determining the ques-
tion of the court’s jurisdiction.280 Finding forum non conveniens akin
to venue and accounting for prior Supreme Court precedent allowing
for venue dismissals in advance of jurisdictional determinations,281
the Court held that a district court may dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds even in advance of determining jurisdiction.282
As noted above, the outcome of this decision has been substantial:
forum non conveniens motions have increased.283 As part of that
increase, Courts are not engaging in personal jurisdiction determi-
nations and choice-of-law questions are being subsumed within the
larger rubric of the forum non conveniens analysis. In a nutshell,
district courts are now empowered to resist choice-of-law analysis,
especially when a foreign plaintiff and foreign law are involved, in
that they have wide discretion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds.
Sinochem is thus an important decision for transnational
litigation generally. To put it in perspective, roughly 120,000 law-
suits since 1986 involving a non-U.S. party were filed in federal
district courts.284 Since 2005, when the most recent data were
reported, 1976 alienage cases terminated in U.S. federal district
courts.285 Although no precise figures exist on the personal jurisdic-
tion and conflict-of-laws question just presented here, many of these
First Principles, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 323, 328 (2009) (“[I]n our federal system, given (1) the
Supreme Court’s rather mild limits on in personam jurisdiction, (2) its almost complete laissez
faire as to state choice-of-law decisions, (3) the way in which products and buyers wander
among the states, and (4) modern courts’ virtually complete indifference to contract provisions
relating to liability, firms selling in interstate commerce cannot, as a practical matter, match
selling prices to varying levels of litigation risk.”).
280. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 428-29 (2007).
281. Id. at 429-32.
282. Id. at 436. Specifically, if “subject-matter or personal jurisdiction is difficult to
determine, and forum non conveniens considerations weigh heavily in favor of dismissal, the
court properly takes the less burdensome course” by issuing a forum non conveniens dismissal
without determining whether jurisdiction is present. Id.
283. See supra Part III.C.1.
284. Whytock, supra note 24, at 74 n.18.
285. Id.
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cases likely touched on transnational legal issues as opposed to
being concerned with solely the application of domestic law to
transnational facts. Indeed, the most recent study reviewing federal
cases from 1990 to 2005 found that at least 200 cases raised the
issue of whether foreign law should apply in tort cases.286 This
number could be higher, given that this study excluded cases in
which the court did not make a choice-of-law decision.287 Personal
jurisdiction determinations will thus be relevant in many of these
cases and will become increasingly relevant should the Court decide
to limit federal law in the area of international human rights
litigation.288
Given these numbers and the accelerating process of globaliza-
tion, a significant number of cases filed in U.S. courts in the years
to come will raise transnational personal jurisdiction and conflict-of-
laws issues. In at least some of these cases, courts will be thrust into
choosing between competing normative claims as the parties pre-
sent these claims to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Domestic courts
will face the choice between domestic and foreign laws, and in some
cases foreign laws that do not comport with domestic normative
commitments. How a domestic court is to resolve this ethical tension
is less than clear but obviously important for scholars and practitio-
ners.
This is a question at the very core of judicial discretion in
transnational cases. If one accepts the proposition that a forum
court should be concerned with nonforum interests289—a noble, yet
contestable, statement290—a domestic court must, in reaching a
286. Whytock, supra note 10, at 504 n.121.
287. See id.
288. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (regarding whether corporations are liable for international human
rights abuses under the Alien Tort Statute); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(c) (1971) (noting that “the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue” are relevant in choice-of-law analysis). The value of
considering nonforum interests is justifiably stronger in cases involving certain
multijurisdictional causes of action. See, e.g., James R. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations
on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 381, 428
(1985) (arguing that the application of forum law to a multistate defamation claim cannot only
“discourage[ ] interstate publication” but can also “unjustifiably infringe[ ] on first amendment
freedoms”). 
290. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 93 (1991) (noting that
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decision, balance the norms of at least two juridical systems: it must
determine whether domestic legal norms should give way, accommo-
date, or preempt legal norms of a foreign legal system.291 In cases
arising between the several United States, such questions are
largely resolved through application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and other constitutional doctrines, such as due process and
equal protection.292 Indeed, the archetypical conflict of laws and
normative commitments in U.S. cases between federal law and state
law is resolved through the Supremacy Clause.293 In cases that
implicate foreign—that is, non-U.S.—law, the process for negotiat-
ing these normative commitments has only minimal constitutional
control.294 In fact, these questions are apparently more likely to be
resolved through forum non conveniens than other doctrines that
more concretely grapple with the issues at stake in many transna-
tional cases.
when a court shows such concern for nonforum interests, specifically by electing to apply
nonforum laws, it “subordinates [the forum’s] own policies, ... generate[s] irrational and
discriminatory classifications, and undermine[s] forum policy for future cases”).
291. The Supreme Court has generally given state courts significant license to make their
own decisions about whether to apply the forum’s own law or that of another forum, adhering
to its principle that “it is frequently the case ... that a court can lawfully apply either the law
of one State or the contrary law of another.” Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727
(1988); see also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
292. See Laycock, supra note 291, at 259-60 (noting that the constitutional doctrines that
shape domestic choice-of-law doctrine in the United States share a common purpose: the
express prohibition of the states “treat[ing] each other like foreign countries” in order to build
a common nation).
293. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260 (2000)
(“Under the Supremacy Clause, ... [c]ourts are required to disregard state law if ... it
contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”).
294. U.S. judges frequently use, cite, and interpret foreign law; indeed, they may be
constitutionally required to do so if the case involves a valid contractual clause specifying the
applicability of foreign law to the controversy, or if conflict-of-laws principles require such
applicability. See Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 59, 61-65 (2009). Furthermore, it may be constitutionally acceptable for a
U.S. court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction, under the Alien Tort Statute or any other
federal law, over a controversy even if the court will use foreign law to resolve the controversy.
See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 57-58 (1985). Interestingly, some U.S.
states have constitutional and statutory provisions that prohibit a court from applying foreign
law if such application violates individual rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. See
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1233 & nn.3-4 (2011).
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In light of this litigation reality, what is needed is a new approach
to personal jurisdiction that connects personal jurisdiction with
forum non conveniens and choice of law. The doctrines should be
connected because folding choice-of-law considerations into forum
non conveniens analysis, and using that analysis to avoid personal
jurisdiction determinations, obscures the substantive implications
of the doctrine and creates “an informal and inconsistent process”
giving unbounded discretion to courts.295 The next Section proposes
an approach that brings choice of law more concretely to light.
B. Transnational Personal Jurisdiction: A New Approach
Based on the above analysis, this Article offers the following
default rule for transnational personal jurisdiction cases. A state
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant not
served with process within the state’s borders when (1) the defen-
dant has received constitutionally adequate notice,296 (2) the state
has a constitutionally sufficient interest in applying its law or
adjudicating a controversy involving its domiciliaries, and (3) the
policies of other interested nations whose laws would be arguably
applicable are given due respect and consideration and would not be
adversely affected by the exercise of jurisdiction. In determining
state interests, recourse would be given to choice of law.297 
The three steps for a court would be as follows. First, the court
should determine at the personal jurisdiction stage whether domes-
tic or foreign law would apply. Second, if U.S. law would apply, then
the court should exercise personal jurisdiction when (1) the plaintiff
and defendant are both domestic, subject to transfer, (2) the plaintiff
is a U.S. domiciliary and the defendant is a foreign domiciliary,
subject to a forum non conveniens dismissal when there are extreme
cases of inconvenience to the defendant with due regard given to the
question of enforcement of judgments, (3) the plaintiff is a foreign
295. Stein, supra note 196, at 841.
296. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
297. For an extensive discussion of how the consideration of state interests, rather than
only the rights of the individual litigants, has come to impact choice-of-law doctrine in the
United States, see Hans W. Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections
on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEX. L. REV. 141 (1967); Lea Brilmayer,
Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989); and Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990).
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domiciliary and the defendant is a U.S. domiciliary, subject to
transfer, and (4) if the plaintiff is a foreign domiciliary and the
defendant is also a foreign domiciliary, subject to the exceptions
noted above in (2). Third, if foreign law would apply, then the court
should give due respect and consideration as to the impact that
asserting U.S. jurisdiction would have on foreign law.298 In what
follows, the Article details various party and choice-of-law lineups
for transnational cases and points to potential solutions to transna-
tional personal jurisdiction problems. 
Domestic Plaintiff v. Domestic Defendant (question of foreign law)299
To begin with, such a case is least likely to be subject to the per-
sonal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens problems discussed
above.300 As such, it is a relatively easy case. The presence of a
domestic defendant means that the defendant will be subject to
personal jurisdiction in one of the several states.301 The presence of
a domestic plaintiff means that the court will generally defer to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and will not dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.302 The implication of foreign law in the case
does, however, give a court at least some discretion to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds.303 Before doing so, however, courts
298. For an attempt to do this in the context of international comity, see generally Donald
Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010).
299. I note that a Domestic Plaintiff v. Domestic Defendant case in which U.S. state law
is at issue would be resolved through domestic personal jurisdiction doctrines, as the concern
in these cases is about both due process and the allocation of adjudicatory and prescriptive
authority between the several states. See supra Part II.A.
300. See supra Parts II-III.
301. Clearly a U.S. citizen defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in the court of the
state in which he or she resides. See supra text accompanying note 141. However, such a
defendant is also subject to personal jurisdiction in another state, as long as the defendant
has “certain minimum contacts with” the other state so that such exercise of personal
jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
302. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981). The main reason for this
is that “the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is
convenient,” which it presumptively is if a domestic plaintiff files the lawsuit in his or her own
state. Id.
303. The applicability of foreign law to a controversy is one of the “[f]actors of public
interest” that courts may consider in assessing whether to dismiss a case on forum non
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should be concerned at first with whether U.S. state law could apply
to the case. This is so because even when foreign facts allegedly give
rise to an injury, state law might apply to the claim, especially when
state law and foreign law do not conflict.
As the Court explained in its most recent choice-of-law cases, a
court must first consider whether the laws competing for application
conflict.304 If the laws do not conflict, “[t]here can be no injury in
applying [state] law,”305 so long as the state has “a significant con-
tact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that the choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
tally unfair.”306 In such a situation, the court need not resolve the
case as a transnational one or resort to forum non conveniens. If
foreign law applies under choice-of-law rules, then the question for
the court would be whether that law can be determined under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 and, if needed, through expert
testimony.307 To the extent that it can, the district court would be
constitutionally justified in rendering a decision so long as one of its
domiciliaries is involved in the case and the defendant is not sub-
stantially inconvenienced. Even in such cases of inconvenience, the
more appropriate outcome would be to transfer the case to the
defendant’s home state under the federal transfer statute.308 Only
to the extent that foreign law cannot be determined and state law
cannot be applied would dismissing the case on forum non
conveniens grounds appear appropriate.
conveniens grounds. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). As a result, many
courts have “held that the need to apply foreign law favors dismissal.” Piper, 454 U.S. at 260
n.29.
304. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985) (“We must first
determine whether Kansas law conflicts in any material way with any other law which could
apply.”).
305. Id. at 816.
306. Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
307. The relevant part of this rule reads as follows: “In determining foreign law, the court
may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1. Although
the use of expert testimony to assist in the interpretation and application of foreign law is
permitted if needed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is not required. E.g., Bodum
USA, Inc. v. La Cafetiere, Inc., 621 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2010).
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
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Domestic Plaintiff v. Foreign Defendant (question of U.S. law)
Unlike the first case, the presence of a foreign defendant means
that personal jurisdiction will be an issue. Obviously, should the
defendant be subject to general jurisdiction, then the court would be
justified in hearing the case. However, rather than focusing on
specific contacts with the forum state,309 the question for the court
should first be what law applies. To the extent that U.S. law applies,
the court would be justified in hearing the case so long as the de-
fendant is not unreasonably inconvenienced. Here again, presence
of a domestic plaintiff means that the court will generally defer to
the plaintiff’s choice of forum and will not dismiss on forum non
conveniens grounds.310 The appropriateness of such a dismissal
would need to be balanced with the domestic plaintiff’s interest in
having the case heard in her home forum.
Domestic Plaintiff v. Foreign Defendant (question of foreign law)
The presence of a domestic plaintiff means that the court will
generally defer to the plaintiff’s choice of forum and will not dismiss
on forum non conveniens grounds.311 The implication of foreign law
does, however, give a court at least some discretion to dismiss on
forum non conveniens grounds.312 Here again, assuming a lack of
general jurisdiction, courts should be concerned at first with
whether U.S. state law could apply to the case. To the extent that it
can, the case would be similar to the prior case. To the extent
foreign law is applicable, the court should concretely weigh the
309. A plurality of the Supreme Court recently held that a New Jersey court set to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a British corporation would violate the Due Process Clause, because
“[a]t no time did [the corporation] engage in any activities in New Jersey that reveal an intent
to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws.” J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in the case, Justice
Breyer succinctly described just how minimal the defendant’s contacts were with the state of
New Jersey. It had sold and shipped only one machine there, it used an American distributor
for the purpose of selling its merchandise in the United States, and, although the
manufacturer’s employees had visited trade shows in several American cities, none were in
New Jersey. See id. at 2786 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
310. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981).
311. See id. 
312. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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difficulty in ascertaining that law against the plaintiff’s interest in
having the case heard in her home forum. 
Foreign Plaintiff v. Domestic Defendant (question of foreign law)
In this case, the jurisdictional question is easy given that a
domestic defendant is involved. A traditional forum non conveniens
analysis may, however, point to dismissal in light of the fact that a
foreign plaintiff is present.313 Choice of law helps resolve the prob-
lem by encouraging a court to determine whether U.S. state law can
apply. I note, however that the state must have some contact with
the parties or occurrence giving rise to litigation to make the court’s
application of that state’s law comport with due process.314 As the
Supreme Court has explained, Fourteenth Amendment due process
requires that “for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a con-
stitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamen-
tally unfair.”315 The Court adopted this test to regulate the applica-
tion of state law in the state-to-state context. A logical corollary
follows, however, that if a state court316—or a federal court —cannot
apply forum law or the law of another state without sufficient
contacts, so too it cannot apply any other law without sufficient
contacts. The question, of course, is what amounts to sufficient
contacts, especially in the international context. Although the
Supreme Court has intimated that general jurisdiction plus
313. Forum non conveniens dismissals may be more likely in cases involving foreign
plaintiffs not only because the convenience of the defendant is generally the primary
consideration but also because of the plaintiff’s obvious engagement in blatant and unfair
forum shopping in selecting the forum. In Piper, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s
dismissal of the case on forum non conveniens grounds, ruling that the district court was
“fully justified” in affording the foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum little deference, as “the
central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient.”
Piper, 454 U.S. at 255-56. The district court judge had rejected the Scottish plaintiff’s choice
of a U.S. forum, characterizing her actions as seeking only to take advantage of “the more
liberal rules concerning products liability law” and “the more liberal tort rules provided for
the protection of citizens and residents of the United States.” Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479
F. Supp. 727, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
314. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
315. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); Hague 449 U.S. at 312-13.
316. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
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additional factors might provide such a nexus,317 the bounds of that
test in the context of the application of state law or foreign law to
foreign facts is an open question.
Foreign Plaintiff v. Foreign Defendant (question of U.S. law)
Recent Supreme Court case law has held that, generally speak-
ing, federal laws have a geographic scope. The Court has made clear
that federal law is presumed not to apply extraterritorially absent
a clear indication of congressional intent. In EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), for example, the Court held that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not apply extraterritorially to
torts committed by U.S. employers against U.S. citizens employed
abroad.318 Courts, it explained, must “assume that Congress legis-
lates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritori-
ality.”319 Likewise, just this past Term in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court held that section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially to
“provide[ ] a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and
American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities
traded on foreign exchanges.”320 As in ARAMCO, the Court applied
the “longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”321 “When a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application,”
the Court instructed, “it has none.”322 The presumption reflects prac-
tical considerations. It “protect[s] against unintended clashes be-
tween our laws and those of other nations which could result in
317. See Hague, 449 U.S. at 317-18 & n.24 (noting that because the defendant was “doing
business in Minnesota and was undoubtedly aware that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota
employee, it had to have anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident in which
Mr. Hague was involved”).
318. 499 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006))
(altering only the extraterritoriality of federal antidiscrimination statutes, not the
presumption stated in ARAMCO). 
319. Id. at 248.
320. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875, 2883 (2010).
321. Id. at 2877 (quoting ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285 (1949))).
322. Id. at 2878.
1554 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1489
international discord.”323 Consequently, when a plaintiff seeks
recovery under federal law for injuries sustained abroad, courts
must ask at the outset whether the asserted cause of action extends
overseas.324 
Of course, this presumption is one that applies only when courts
construe federal law. Whether such a presumption is transferable
to a court reviewing claims under state law or whether the appropri-
ate analysis is, as discussed above and below, due process based is
unclear. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States implies that the analysis should be the same.325 But
the Supreme Court has not spoken to this issue. In any event,
although this presumption may not be applicable in interpreting
state law, a court can only apply law subject to due process. Further
work remains to be done to determine whether court decisions
regarding extraterritorial application of federal law should apply to
cases raising state law claims.
This proposal, however, does not cover the situation addressed
next. 
Foreign Plaintiff v. Foreign Defendant (question of foreign law)
Such a case, sometimes referred to in a slightly different context
as an “f-cubed case,”326 is most appropriately dealt with through
forum non conveniens. This is so because such a case risks, as
explained above, the unconstitutional application of U.S. law to
foreign facts. In any event, such cases are an exception even under
present jurisdictional theory on account of a lack of contacts with
the United States. The lack of a U.S. nexus thus becomes a compel-
ling factor in the analysis as well as the fact that non-U.S. law is to
323. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993); see also Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248.
324. See, e.g., Sale, 509 U.S. at 170-74; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Hond., 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
325. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
reporters’ note 5 (1986) (noting that the same extraterritoriality principles govern federal and
state law, except in the case of federal preemption under the foreign affairs power).
326. See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global
Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 475-76 (explaining such cases as
foreign plaintiffs bringing suit against foreign defendants for alleged illegal conduct occurring
outside the United States).
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apply. The next Section considers the benefits of and objections to
this suggested approach.
C. Benefits and Objections
The major benefit of this approach is that it more concretely and
candidly requires United States courts to grapple with the applica-
tion of United States and foreign law to foreign facts or parties. By
not hiding the choice-of-law analysis in personal jurisdiction and
forum non conveniens analyses, it provides a more complete frame-
work for plaintiffs to make their cases and for courts to sort out
complicated questions in full light. In so doing, the public at large
is also informed as to the appropriate role of courts in transnational
cases. We must decide whether United States courts should be open
to transnational cases, and to the extent that they are, identify any
precise limits on when a foreign case should be heard in the United
States.
To return again to the Court’s recent decision in Nicastro, the
benefits of this suggested approach are many. First, unlike the
Nicastro plurality’s near-singular focus on targeted contacts at the
forum state of New Jersey,327 the above analysis illustrates that the
most-concerned state was not the United Kingdom, where the
Nicastro case would have had to be filed under the Court’s approach,
but the State of New Jersey. This is so because a New Jersey domi-
ciliary was injured in New Jersey and thus New Jersey’s law could
apply in a constitutionally permissible manner.328 Given these facts,
choice of law—and with it the choice of New Jersey law—clears
much of the intellectual overgrowth appended to the personal
jurisdiction doctrine. In so doing, this approach illustrates that if a
suit may be brought against a corporation in some state—in
Nicastro, the United Kingdom—and that state will apply the law of
the state of injury—which is New Jersey—then bringing the case in
New Jersey would be appropriate, unless shown that the choice of
forum presented substantial inconvenience to the defendant that
would compromise the litigation of the case.
327. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (plurality opinion).
328. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (illustrating that the
place of injury would give the state a significant contact creating state interests to justify
application of that state’s law).
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This suggested approach thus affords district courts the opportu-
nity to determine up front whether they should hear the case at all.
As noted, many cases that are dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds ultimately return to the United States as enforcement of
judgment proceedings. In these proceedings, U.S. courts have lim-
ited powers of review, so the important interests of the United
States in adjudicating these cases are not fully realized. The
primary benefit of the above approach is that it more forthrightly
brings choice-of-law consideration to the forefront of jurisdictional
analysis.
The above approach is not without objections. First, the approach
may seem a departure from Supreme Court case law. But the ap-
proach can actually be seen as in accord with the Court’s approach
to transnational cases. Although the Court has stated that choice of
law should not obfuscate the personal jurisdiction analysis, those
cases must be read based on the facts of the cases. Those cases were
about purely domestic issues. Transnational issues raise a host of
other concerns that, at present, are taken account of through the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. That doctrine is less than forth-
right as to the precise issues at stake in most transnational cases.
Second, the approach may encourage parties to file transnational
cases in the United States. Of course, U.S. courts should not hear all
transnational cases. One objection is that conflating choice of law
and personal jurisdiction means that many courts may decide to
hear cases that are more appropriately adjudicated elsewhere. By
conflating personal jurisdiction and choice of law, courts may be
inclined to apply forum law and risk creating international relations
concerns. These concerns present compelling questions bearing on
the institutional competency of U.S. courts to resolve transnational
problems. In my view, a residual forum non conveniens analysis will
resolve most of these problems.
Third, the approach does not resolve complex agency relation-
ships that are frequently at play in transnational cases.329 Further
work thus remains to be done in applying these rules to more
complex factual scenarios in light of case law developments. 
329. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
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V. A REVISED TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION NARRATIVE
This Part offers several observations to guide future scholarship
in the area of transnational litigation. It seeks to discern the role of
courts in a plural, transnational society as they go about negotiating
conflicting norms in transnational legal cases. This Part also
scrutinizes the future of the transnational litigation narrative in
U.S. courts.
First, notwithstanding the transnational litigation narrative,
courts appear to exhibit the fact that they are primarily national
actors. That U.S. courts seem to favor U.S. plaintiffs over foreign
plaintiffs, favor the application of U.S. law over foreign law, utilize
a personal jurisdiction doctrine that focuses on contacts as opposed
to choice of law, and increasingly use the forum non conveniens
doctrine to resist hearing transnational cases points to a failure of
the transnational litigation narrative to convince and equip courts
to deal with such cases. In the end, this may be due to the fact that
the narrative was largely concerned with encouraging public law
litigation and internalizing international law norms. If the transna-
tional litigation narrative is to have any purchase, therefore, it must
refocus on private cases and the concrete domestic doctrines that
courts use to resolve such cases. It must also focus on questions of
choice of law.
Second, the lack of a clear method for negotiating conflicts be-
tween legal orders perhaps encourages courts to resist conflicts and
reject the application of foreign law and/or dismiss the case in favor
of a foreign forum. In the United States, courts are resolving more
and more normative questions at the procedural level, even in
private international law cases. This intimates that courts are
resisting substantive engagement with transnational law. At one
level, this is not problematic; many cases should not be heard in
U.S. courts because such cases present intractable questions of legal
and regulatory authority between states. The problem, however,
with the present transnational litigation narrative is that it does not
concretely focus on resolving conflicts. This is why, as explained
above, a choice-of-law approach may reinvigorate the narrative.
Third, even when cases survive procedural questions, U.S. courts
resolve many substantive questions by invoking legal formulae
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designed to resist engaging law’s normativity and especially the
normativity of foreign law. As explained above, U.S. courts favor
forum non conveniens to avoid a foreign legal order’s normative
claims. Here again, courts should be equipped to deal with questions
of foreign law and should be encouraged to focus on the potential for
conflict rather than the fact that foreign law is applicable.
With the increased pace of globalization and transnational liti-
gation, we may, however, be at the beginning of a potential change
in this area of law, and with it, a change in the transnational liti-
gation narrative. As plaintiffs seek out through forum shopping
and/or are forced through jurisdictional rules and forum non
conveniens to utilize foreign fora for litigation, the potential for
normative clashes between different legal systems, especially when
cases come back to the United States as enforcement of judgment
proceedings, increases. The process for engaging these norms is far
from clear. Put simply, even in cases involving countries with simi-
lar political organizations, significant differences in societal values
and legal rules still exist that will require court resolution.330 
The most notable question facing courts in transnational cases is
whether they should view themselves as purely domestic or trans-
national actors. Should courts be charged with ascertaining whether
certain foreign normative commitments should be respected, accom-
modated, or preempted based upon an evaluation of the differences
between the forum’s policies and those of the foreign forum? Or
should the role of the courts be to develop international rules to
negotiate these differences that give respect not only to domestic
legal interests but also those of the international legal system writ
large? 
Finally, there are questions of institutional competency. Whether
courts are the most appropriate actors to exercise the lead role in
managing transnational cases is not totally clear. This question
thus raises an antecedent question concerning what the appropriate
role of U.S. courts is in transnational cases and whether other
institutional actors, such as the U.S. Congress, should have a role
in transnational litigation. Until a time of congressional action,
330. Robert Wai, In the Name of the International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Internationalist Transformation of Canadian Private International Law, 39 CANADIAN Y.B.
INT’L L. 117, 185 (2001).
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however, the courts are left to their own devices. These devices
should more accurately and practically take account of transna-
tional issues in adjudicating cases.
CONCLUSION
We live in a transnational legal order. But what this means for
the practice of law is far from certain. Commentators encourage the
transnational, but courts seem to resist it. This Article has sought
to provide some clarity to the murky waters of transnational
litigation by focusing on what happens when personal jurisdiction
goes transnational. In so doing, the Article has pointed to new ways
to argue for the engagement of transnational law in the United
States. If there is hope of a truly transnational practice in the
United States, that practice must be concerned with the ways in
which domestic doctrines operate concretely in the transnational
arena. This Article is a first step in that direction.
